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  Resumo 
A questão-chave desta dissertação se trata da situação de desemprego entre os jovens na 
África do Sul e as iniciativas de criação de emprego introduzidas pelo governo democrático 
para criar emprego. Com o desemprego geral em 25% da população em idade ativa e o 
desemprego dos jovens acima de 50% não é de surpreender que a África do Sul esteja 
enfrentando uma crise tripla de desigualdade, pobreza e desemprego. Havia muito otimismo 
em relação ao Congresso Nacional Africano no sentido de criar uma vida melhor para todos 
na sequência da sua vitória eleitoral esmagadora 1994 que pôs fim à regra do Apartheid 
Branco. Vinte anos depois, a situação econômica enfrentada por milhões de sul-africanos 
ainda era a mesma. As reformas econômicas introduzidas favoreceram os negócios 
organizados e tiveram pouco, se algum, efeito sobre o desemprego. Na medida em que o 
governo introduziu programas de criação de emprego, e de forma notável expandiu programas 
de obras públicas e, posteriormente, estabeleceu incentivos fiscais reduziu os níveis de 
desemprego experimentado no país. A opinião generalizada de que os níveis de desemprego 
na África do Sul são devido às baixas qualificações não procede quando se analisa a natureza 
da economia sul-africana que ainda está presa no Minerals-Energy-Complex e da sua ligação 
ao capital financeiro. Uma reforma holística está garantida para alterar o estado atual da 
economia. Isto deve incluir, entre outros, uma reforma em grande escala das políticas 
industriais, macroeconômicas e fiscais atuais para estimular a demanda por mão de obra. A 
partir disso, as empresas estatais devem ser habilitadas (e ampliadas) para desempenhar um 
papel de liderança nas iniciativas de investimento de capital. Por fim, um movimento sindical 
unido e sociedade civil devem garantir que essas reformas aconteçam de forma urgente. 
 
Palavras-chave: Desemprego, Jovem, África do Sul, Desigualdade, Pobreza. 
 
    
 
 
Abstract 
 
The main objective of this dissertation is to examine the state of youth unemployment in 
South Africa and the employment creation initiatives introduced by the democratic 
government. With general unemployment rate at 25% of the working age population and 
youth unemployment above 50% it is hardly surprising that South Africa is facing a triple 
crisis of inequality, poverty and unemployment. There was much optimism that the ruling 
African National Congress would create a better life for all following its overwhelming 1994 
election victory that brought an end to White Apartheid rule. 20 years later the economic 
situation faced by millions of South Africans is still the same. The economic reforms 
introduced favoured organised business and had little, if any, effect on unemployment. 
Government introduced employment creation schemes, most notable the expanded public 
works programme and later the employment tax incentive neither schemes reduced the levels 
of unemployment experienced in the country. The generally held view that unemployment 
levels in South Africa is due to poor skills is not supported when we analyze the nature of the 
South African economy that is still trapped in the Minerals-Energy-Complex and its link to 
finance capital. A holistic reform is warranted to change the current state of the economy. 
This must include, among others, large scale reform of the current industrial, macro-economic 
and fiscal policies to stimulate demand for labour. State owned enterprises should be 
supported (and expanded) to play a leading role in capital investment initiatives. To that end, 
a united trade union movement and civil society must ensure that such reforms happen as a 
matter of urgency.    
 
Keywords: Unemployment, Youth, South Africa, inequality, poverty 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the current period there is not much to like about South Africa than there is to like. After 
decades of white minority rule the release of Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela and unbanning of the 
African National Congress and other anti-Apartheid organisations in the early 1990s signalled 
change and, with that, the hope that all South Africans can now have a better life for all.  
 21 years after the first democratic elections in April 1994 that hope disappeared for 
many South Africans and indeed non-South Africans. Faced with the triple challenge of 
poverty, inequality and high unemployment, the economic situation of the vast majority of 
South Africans worsened since 1994. Many more slipped into poverty situations, inequality 
increased and in the process making SA the second most unequal society in the world.  
 To make matters worse, the period 2007/8 and 2015 marks a black spot on SA. During 
both periods black African migrant workers fell victim, including losing their life, to 
xenophobic attacks. It is argued that the attack on foreign nationals happen because of limited 
employment opportunities in the labour market. This is an absurdity. The SA economy, 
historically, was built by migrant labour from the rest of Africa. It is disingenuous to suggest 
that they are taking away the jobs of South Africans. A sad state of affairs. 
 The state of the SA economy too is not a good story. Over the period 2007-2009 and 
2014 till today (June 2015) the country have been facing daily power outages, locally called 
load shedding. This happens because the national electricity supply cannot keep up with the 
demands of industry and residents.  
 This dissertation attempts to make sense of the third challenge, that of unemployment, 
in particular youth unemployment. This as SA is experiencing one of the highest levels of 
youth unemployment in the world. One of the key reasons advanced by the SA government 
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(and indeed the business sector and organised labour) is that of poor skills. This, so it is 
argued, is as a result of the Apartheid labour market system. The dissertation is accordingly 
structured in the following manner: 
 The first chapter is an analysis of the SA economy over a 20 year period, from the 
advent of democracy in 1994 to 2014. This period coincides with the government’s own 
review and indeed that of other civil society organisations. 2015 is also the 60
th
 anniversary of 
the freedom charter, a fundamental policy document adopted by the ANC and other anti-
Apartheid organisations in 1955.  
 The second chapter critiques the reasons for the high level of youth unemployment of 
the ANC government and its social partners, organised business, organised labour and the 
community constituency members.  
 The third chapter looks at the employment initiatives of the government, the expanded 
public works programme and the Employment Tax incentive or, as it is more commonly 
known, the youth wage subsidy.  
 The last part is a summary and some conclusions on the entire thesis. Much of the 
conclusions appears in the body of the thesis.  
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Chapter 1 
THE NATURE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY  
– A 20 YEAR REVIEW 
Among its manifold effects, unemployment contributes to the “social exclusion” 
of some groups and it leads to losses of self-reliance, self-confidence and 
psychological and physical health 
Sen, Amartya, Development as freedom 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The history of South Africa (SA) is indeed an interesting one. Colonised by the Dutch in the 
middle of the 17
th
 Century and later by Britain, the most recognised feature is that of National 
Party (NP) Apartheid rule from 1948 – 1994. It was over this period that the white NP state 
passed legislation after legislation enforcing the subjugation of the majority black population 
by a white minority. The nature of the SA economy and labour market developments are 
equally interesting. Since the discovery of diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886, during which 
period SA experienced massive economic growth, much of the labour supply consisted of 
cheap black migrant labour from within SA and neighbouring countries. Gelb, for example, 
note that: 
… it is worth noting that the country’s migrant labour system stretches well 
beyond its borders into the entire Southern African region. In 1906, South Africa 
only provided 23% of its 81 000 mineworkers, and in 1973 the share had dropped 
to 20% of 422 000 workers. By 1986, South African made up 60% of 536 000 
workers. Lesotho and Mozambique were historically the biggest regional sources 
of labour.
1
 
                                                          
1
 Gelb Stephen, 2004, “Inequality in South Africa: Nature, Causes and Responses”, Policy Initiative on 
Addressing Inequality in Middle-income Countries, The EDGE Institute, Johannesburg.  
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This largely contributed to the race based wealth and income inequality SA is synonymous 
for. It was not until 1994 that apartheid rule came to an end with the first democratic elections 
taking place in April of that year. Faced with a number of economic ‘deficiencies’, locally 
referred to as the triple-crisis of unemployment, poverty and inequality, the African National 
Congress (ANC) government’s economic policy fundamentals, 20 years later, is the subject 
matter of much debate. This, as consecutive ANC election manifestos trumpeted on the 
slogan of building a better life for all. It is in that context that this chapter, in reviewing the 
nature of the South African economy over the past 20 years, will look at a number of its key 
features such as unemployment with specific focus on youth unemployment; the driving 
forces of the SA economy which many argue is located within the Minerals-Energy Complex 
(MEC) and labour market trends over the period 1994 till 2014. But, it would be naïve to 
simply try and analyse the SA economy without locating it within its global context and 
Africa in particular. 
1.2 POPULATION  
As table 1 shows, the SA population grew by an estimated 13.44 million people between 1994 
and 2014. Over the same period there was a decline in the rate of population growth, from 2.4 
per cent in 1994 to 1.58 per cent in 2014. Infant mortality declined from an estimated 59 
deaths per 1000 live births in 1994 to 34,4 per 1 000 live births in 2014. Life expectancy at 
birth was 54.12 years for males and 64.38 for females in 1994. This increased to 59.1 years 
for males but a slight decrease to 63.1 years for females in 2014. This is significantly lower 
than the average life expectancy of 74 years old for an upper middle income country.
2
 A 
significant contributor to such a lower life expectancy is the HIV and AIDS pandemic with a 
reported 10.2% (5.5 million) HIV/Aids prevalency rate.
3
 Nonetheless, the increased life 
expectancy can be attributed to a greater roll-out of antiretroviral drugs over the last few 
years. In terms of race profiling, 80.3% of the population is African, 8.8% Coloured, 8.4% 
white and 2.5% labelled as Indian/Asian.
4
  
Urbanisation (or inbound migration) warrants special mention. This is due to the fact 
that Apartheid legislation prohibited blacks from living in urban areas. In fact, black 
                                                          
2
 World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2014. 
3
 Statistics South Africa, 2014.  
4
 As much as the South African constitution draws no distinction between the various “races”, it has nonetheless 
become an element of SA race relations. For example, statistics still reflect individual race profiling. So too, with 
certain pieces of legislation like the Employment equity act, etc. 
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‘homelands’ were created to foster self-determination of different ethnic groups thus 
separating blacks from the rest of SA.
5
 The key piece of legislation introduced by the 
Apartheid Government, the Natives Land Act of 1913, for example, restricted Black land 
ownership to only 8% of total available land with the remaining land made available to whites 
only.
6
  
To facilitate the movement of cheap migrant labour, the Apartheid governement 
introduced pass laws to allow migrant workers to move between rural and urban areas. It was 
only in 1994 that the former homeland system was abolished and those teritories  reintegrated 
into the rest of SA. It is for this reason that the statistical data on the number and rate of 
urbanisation between 1994 and 2014 is a disputed area in that the first such census was 
conducted in 1996 and the last in 2001. Based on those statistical data, the 1996 level of urban 
population stood at 64.8% growing to 68.5% in 2001.
7
 Whether the statistical data over the 
period 1996 to 2001 is disputed or not, it accords with current United Nations (UN) 
urbanisation per centage rates, Figure 1 below.
8
 The obvious difficulty with the per centage 
urbanisation rate between 1996 – 2001 and that of 2014 being roughly the same is that it 
creates the impression that urbanisation ‘stabilised’, i.e. no increase in the urban population. I 
do not believe that to be the case. 
Table 1: Population of South Africa, 1994 and 2014 
Year 
Total 
population 
Male Female 
Population 
growth rate 
(%) 
1994 40562 20001 20561 2.4 
2014 54002 26366 27635 1.58 
Source: ILO KILM, Statssa  
                                                          
5
 South African history online. Available at http://www.sahistory.org.za/special-features/homelands (Accessed 
on 11 March 2014). 
6
 See in this regard, Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, ‘REFLECTIONS ON THE IMPACT OF THE 
NATIVES’ LAND ACT, 1913, ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA’, 20 May 2013. Available 
at http://www.parliament.gov.za/content/Land%20Act%20-%20Paper%203%20-%20Langa%20-%20Final.pdf 
(Accessed on 12 March 2015).  
7
 StatsSA, 2003. See also 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOUTHAFRICA/Resources/Urbanisation_dynamics_paper_21_June_08.
pdf (Accessed on 03 March 2015). 
8
 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2014). 
World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision, Highlights (ST/ESA/SER.A/352). Available at 
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Highlights/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf (Accessed on 05 March 2015).  
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As is generally the case, urbanisation comes about as people search for employment and 
career opportunities, as industry is normally located in urban areas. It is in that context that 
inward migration, that is, movement between provinces, are heavily concentrated towards the 
two economic centres of the SA economy, Gauteng and the Western Cape.
9
 I pause to make 
the point here that inward migration would not create fluctuation in the total number of 
unemployed people in the country as people would not leave their current employment to 
simply become unemployed in another province. The effect of such migration is that it 
invariably influences the number of unemployed persons per province. The same holds true 
for rural/urban migration.  
Figure 1: South Africa Urban and Rural population 
Source: UNDP World Urbanization Prospects, 2014 
1.3 INCOME AND POVERTY 
South Africa is one of the most unequal societies in the world with a Gini coefficient level of 
0.63 in 2009 with a high of 0.67 in 2006 (Figure 2). Reported statistics indicate that 9 out of 
10 Black Africans (94.2%) lived below the food poverty line (R305 per month, per person) 
whereas whites accounted for only 0.6% of those below the food poverty line.
10
 To point out 
the stark wealth inequality, the 2 richest South Africans, Nicky Oppenheimer and Johann 
Rupert, accumulated wealth equal to half of the country’s population, that is, wealth equal to 
                                                          
9
 Op. cit note 1. 
10
 Statistics South Africa, 2014. 
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26.5 million people.
11
 These levels of inequality have their roots in the racial segregation of 
the population under the Apartheid National Party. According to Morival; 
Capital ownership is still concentrated among few people in South Africa and the 
policies established under the Apartheid regime such as jobs reservation, spatial 
and property restrictions and discrimination in the education, health and social 
services have created a workforce with racially skewed human, social and 
economic capital. Studying top incomes we showed that such economic and 
human capital legacies leave a very long-run footprint. These processes are hard 
to reverse. Individuals belonging to the top income groups were on average 40 
years old in 2008 which means that they were about 26 years old in 1994. They 
went to school under the apartheid regime. We showed that the richest South 
Africans are all highly skilled: about 53% of individuals belonging to the top 1% 
have a university degree. We explained the low percentage of Blacks in the top 
income groups by three factors: ownership concentration in business sectors 
where top income earners are overrepresented, human capital with the high level 
of education of top income earners, and social network and social capital which 
could explain why top management positions are essentially reserved to Whites.
12
 
An associated ill confronting the poor is the lack of basic municipal services. These include 
either non-existent or lack of adequate social services like water and sanitation, housing and 
electricity provision. Over the period 2007 till 2014 there has been an upsurge in service 
delivery protest action from just under 100 such protests in 2007 to over 250 protests in 
2014.
13
 Not surprisingly, the report notes that the high level of youth unemployment is a key 
driver in the service delivery protest action. 
                                                          
11
 Sipho Kings, Inequality mocks SA's freedom, Mail and Guardian, 2014. Available at 
http://mg.co.za/article/2014-10-30-inequality-mocks-sas-freedom (Accessed on 10 March 2015).  
12
 Morival, E., “Top Incomes and Racial Inequality in South Africa Evidence from Tax Statistics and Household 
Surveys 1993 – 2008. 
13
 DM Powell, M O’Donovan, J de Visser – Civic protests barometer 2007-2014- CAPE TOWN: MLGI – 
www.mlgi.org.za (Accessed on 10 March 2015).  
8 
 
 
Figure 2: South Africa Poverty and Income Distribution, 1993 - 2009 
 
Source: ILO KILM 
The poverty headcount by population group have not shifted much since the advent of 
democracy, save to say that a few blacks became instant multi-millionaires mainly through 
Black Economic Empowerment deals facilitated by the African National Congress (ANC) 
government. As Gelb puts it: 
Yet the expectation that South Africa would move onto a path of equalising 
growth have remained unfulfilled. Most attempts to explain this outcome have 
focussed on the inadequacies of the ANC’s leadership – for some analysts, the 
leadership’s lack of commitment to a progressive outcome led them to ‘sell out’ 
and focus on accumulating wealth and power for themselves and a few cronies, 
while for others, the problem was the leadership’s inability to hold together an 
effective political coalition and impose progressive policies on reluctant 
democrats in the white and business communities.
 14
 
The Black majority is still suffering from the ills of apartheid, which can be observed from 
their extreme and continued poverty situation. In this regard it would be useful to reflect on 
key Macroeconomic policy changes that shaped the current South African situation.  
                                                          
14
 Op cit. note 1. See also Bond, P. Elite transition. Pluto Press, London, 2000; Marais, H. South Africa: The 
limits to change. UCT Press, Cape Town & Zed Press, London. 1998 and Terreblanche, S. A History of 
Inequality in South Africa, 1652-2002. University of Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg, 2003. 
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The ANC’s 1994 elections manifesto, titled the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) sought to create ‘A better life for all’. This economic policy was largely 
based on Keynesian economics in that it advocated state intervention to stimulate economic 
growth whilst creating job opportunities and providing social benefits to the vastly 
impoverished black population. 
The fundamentals of this policy position rest on the notion that the state must create an 
economic climate for entrepreneurs to invest in the economy which will in turn create 
employment opportunities and income generation. By generating an income, workers become 
the consumers of the goods produced that in turn will lead to more goods being produced and 
more workers being employed to produce such goods. Thus, capital investment generates 
employment. Also, given the strained relations the Apartheid state had with foreign investors, 
the government had to play an active role to promote market conditions for investment to take 
place.  
Not long thereafter, in 1996, the ANC government ditched the RDP for a more overtly 
neo-liberal economic policy, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (Gear). The 
adoption of Gear signalled a change to ‘free trade’ market economics that led to massive job 
losses in key industries, like clothing and leather that, up until then, survived due to high 
import protection.
15
 Job losses occurred in the public sector too as the privatisation and 
commercialisation of service delivery took shape. This does not suggest that neo-liberal 
policies were new to SA but certainly an expression of the economic policy thinking of the 
new ANC government. In this regard it is important to note that the Apartheid government, in 
1987, pursued large-scale privatisation and commercialisation of state owned enterprises 
(SOE). The state owned steel producer, Iscor, was privatised and so too the commercialisation 
of the electricity supplier, Eskom, the railway services and the independence of the Reserve 
bank during the same year.  
It is thus argued that the neo-liberalisation of the SA economy was not forced on the 
SA government by the IMF or World Bank but rather due to a conscious choice of the SA 
bourgeoisie. Similarly, that the ANC, as a political party and the new government, was not 
‘transformed’ into advancing a neo-liberal agenda from 1996 but the seeds of that predates 
                                                          
15
 Cairncross, Eugene, Post-Apartheid South African Economy: The triumph of Capital in Vaun Cornell (ed), 
(2011), South Africa Today, How do we characterize the social formation?, Papers from the 2011 ILRIG April 
Conference. 
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what is referred to as the 1996 class project.
16
 This situation certainly worsened under the 
ANC government.
17
  
The adoption of Gear was met with much criticism from, in particular, its alliance 
partners, Cosatu and the South African Communist Party (SACP)
18
 who labelled the adoption 
of Gear as going against the fundamentals of the RDP and resolved to actively embark on a 
campaign which involves civic, youth, student, women and other working class organisations 
to resist all elements of Gear such as subsidy cuts, privatisation, labour market flexibility, 
etc.
19
 Notwithstanding their public posturing on Gear, no effective mass protest action took 
place. This is due mainly, as will become evident throughout this dissertation, the ANC’s 
disregard for the views of its minority alliance partners and, on the other hand, Cosatu and the 
SACPs subsequent acceptance of ANC policy positions with moderate reforms. 
 
1.5 GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) AND GROSS NATIONAL INCOME 
(GNI) PER CAPITA, UNIONISATION AND WAGE RATES 
As can be seen from Figure 6, the SA economy never reached its intended target of 6 per cent 
growth per annum. The highest growth rate was 5.6 per cent in 2006 with the lowest being -
1.53 per cent in 2009 following the global economic crisis. Notwithstanding slight recovery 
                                                          
16
 Vaun Cornell (ed), (2011), South Africa Today, How do we characterize the social formation?, Papers from 
the 2011 ILRIG April Conference. The concept “1996 Class project” was coined by Cosatu and the SACP to 
characterise the ANC departure, under Thabo Mbeki, from its 1994 Keynesian economic fundamentals to 
advance an overtly neo-liberal policy in line with IMF/World Bank guidelines. 
17
 In its November 2014 submission to the Special Cosatu Central Executive Committee (CEC), the now 
expelled National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (Numsa), provided a detailed account of how the 
ANC government facilitated foreign ownership in SA. These include, the financial sector being dominated by 4 
large privately owned banks (ABSA, Nedbank, FNB and Standard Bank). ABSA is 56% foreign-owned, 
Standard Bank is at least 40% foreign owned. The Reserve Bank privately owned and has foreign ownership. 
SASOL is about 30% foreign-owned and Arcelor-Mittal is 65% foreign owned. The pharmaceuticals sector is 
dominated by foreign-owned Aspen, Adcock-Ingram, Sanofi, Pfizer, Norvatis, etc. have all significant foreign-
ownership. The construction sector is also monopolised dominated by four players: Murray & Roberts, WBHO, 
Aveng and Group 5, with foreign ownership. The cement sector is also dominated by 4 players (PPC, Alpha, 
Lafarge and Natal Portland). The Forestry sector is also monopolised by two major players, SAPPI and MONDI, 
with the state, through SAFCOL, playing a minor role. Machinery and equipment is a diverse sector: The major 
equipment players are Caterpillar, John Deere/Bell, Komatsu, Manitou SA and Thyssen-Krupp, all foreign. The 
wholesale and retail trade sector is a monopoly industry, dominated by two firms: Shoprite and Pick ‘n Pay, 
which constitute 66% of the market share. Massmart was 60% foreign-owned even before Walmart, Shoprite is 
35%, Truworths is 50%, Foschini is 40% and the JD Group is 40% foreign owned. Available at 
http://www.pod702.co.za/Eyewitnessnews/docs/141107CosatuCEC.pdf (Accessed on 08 November 2014).  
18
 SACP, CRITIQUE OF GOVERNMENT’S MACROECONOMIC STRATEGY: GROWTH, EMPLOYMENT 
AND REDISTRIBUTION, 1997. Available at http://www.dalemckinley.org/articles.html (Accessed on 09 
November 2014). 
19
 http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=2159#sthash.YS3rFqMG.dpuf. Also see Adelzadeh, Asghar. "From 
the RDP to GEAR: the gradual embracing of neo-liberalism in economic policy." Transformation 31 (1996). 
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during 2010/2011, it has been on a downward trend with the 2014 growth rate reaching a 
lowly 1.5%.
20
  
Over the period 1994 to 2012, the SA GDP grew at a remarkable pace from USD136 
billion to USD389.8 billion.
21
 Notwithstanding such GDP growth, recent data (2014) points to 
a declining growth rate when measured against that of developing Sub-Saharan African 
countries that grew at an average of 4.5% year on year.
22
 Notwithstanding the higher 
percentage growth of the Sub-Saharan African developing countries, their Gross National 
Income (GNI) per capita of $1 657 (2013) is significantly lower than that of SA which stood 
at $7 190 (2013) down from its all-time high of $7 460 in 2012 (figure 7 below). 
Figure 6: South Africa GDP growth rate from 1994 till 2013 
 
Source: World Bank 
                                                          
20
 StatsSA, 2014. 
21
 The World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2014. 
22
 World Bank, 2014. 
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Figure 7: Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (Current US$)  
 
Source: World Bank 
1.6 INVESTMENT AND EMPLOYMENT PROFILES 
In its 20-year review, covering the period 1994 to 2014, the South African government 
recognised that investment needed to be between 20 to 25 per cent of GDP in order to foster 
sustained economic growth.
23
 That forecast, as per Figure 8 below, was achieved over the 
period 2007 till 2010 with the highest level of 24.8% in the fourth quarter of GDP in 2008. 
These figures are in conflict with that of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Indicators 
(2013) wherein it is recorded that the only period SA achieved GDP percentages higher than 
20% was in 2007 and 2008 (21.4 and 22.7 per cent respectively).
24
 Notwithstanding this 
discrepancy, what is evident from both sets of figures is that there has been sustained public 
and private sector investment growth over the period 2002 till 2008 with that trend interrupted 
with the 2008 global financial crisis. 
                                                          
23
 Presidency, 2014. 
24
 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, 2013.  
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Figure 8: Investment as a percentage of GDP, third quarter 1983 to third quarter 2013 
 
Source: The Presidency, Twenty Year Review (1994-2014) 
Perhaps another problem is the fact that in 1990, six conglomerates centered on mining and 
finance controlled companies with 80% of the market capitalization on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE).
25
 This situation has not shifted significantly as in 2013 the top 6 
companies had a market capitalisation of 50% of tradable shares which, by implication 
reflects a high concentration of market capitalisation by a few conglomerates. The top four 
(British American Tobacco (market capitalisation R1.05-trillion), SAB Miller (R810-billion), 
BHP Billiton (R559-billion) and Richemont (R457-billion) are all foreign listed with only 
SAB Miller generating 20% of its revenue in SA with the others having limited exposure in 
the local economy.
26
 What this effectively means is that their market capitalisation is located 
in the financial sector of the economy with little, if any, in industrial production. This will be 
unpacked under the section looking at the Minerals-Energy Complex (MEC) that, to many, is 
the source of the SA economic deficiencies.  
In 2012 the SA government adopted a national infrastructure plan to upgrade and 
expand existing infrastructure development. This plan, to be implemented from 2013/14 and 
with a total investment of R827 billion, is meant to address two areas of infrastructural 
development. The first to facilitate improved access to healthcare facilities, schools, water and 
sanitation and the second area investment in the construction of ports, improvements in road 
                                                          
25
 Op. cit note 1. 
26
 See in this regard http://www.timeslive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2013/07/02/six-of-the-best-on-the-jse 
(Accessed on 15 March 2015). 
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and railway systems, electrification plants, etc. to stimulate faster economic growth.
27
 In 
addition to this large scale infrastructural investment coming from the SA national fiscus, 
there is the intent that the newly created Brics Development Bank will invest in infrastructural 
projects in Brics and other emerging countries.
28
  
It should also be noted that the SA government invested an estimated R39.3b in 
infrastructural development for the 2010 Fifa World Cup with no measurable return on such 
huge investment for a single sports event. It is argued that job creation over that period is 
questionable whilst construction companies raked in mega profits.
29
 Whilst it is accepted that 
infrastructural development is a necessity, regard must be had for whether such infrastructural 
development will lead to any economic growth and job creation. 
A related issue that is sometimes ignored is the link between infrastructural investment 
and the environment. As at 2009, South Africa was Africa’s largest Co 2 emitter, contributing 
over 40% of Africa’s total emissions. In terms of per capita Co 2 emissions from energy 
consumption, SA’s ranks amongst the highest in the world with per capita levels double the 
global average and beating its Brics countries like China, India and Brasil with economies 
much bigger than SA.
30
 As a sign that the environmental degradation is to continue, the SA 
government recently signed a $10 billion nuclear energy development deal with Russia’s 
state-owned nuclear company, Rosatom, to build a large-scale nuclear power plant.
31
 This is 
on top of the currently constructed Medupi power station, the fourth largest coal-fired power 
station in the world and the most expensive with an estimated cost of R150 billion.
32
 It may 
be argued that SA needs to invest largely in it energy base, particularly electrification given 
its daily power outages experienced over the last year. 
1.7 GROSS DOMESTICS PRODUCT (GDP) 
The SA government’s 20-year review notes that the share of manufacturing in GDP dropped 
from 21% in 1994 to only 10% in 2012 (Figure 9). This significant drop is attributed to SA 
                                                          
27
 South African Government, National Infrastructure Plan. Available at http://www.gov.za/issues/national-
infrastructure-plan (Accessed on 21 October 2014). 
28
 On the BRICS of Collapse?, Why Emerging Economies Need a Different Development Model, Paper 
prepared by the Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation (GovInn), University of Pretoria (South Africa).  
29
 Cottle E & Rombaldi M, Lesons from South Africa’s FIFA World Cup, Brazil and its Legacy for Labour.  
30
 UrbanEarth, South African Carbon Snapshot, February 2012. Available at 
http://urbanearth.co.za/system/files/private/Urban%20Earth_SA%20Carbon%20Snapshot_0.pdf (Accessed on 
30 October 2014). 
31
 http://rt.com/business/189756-russia-southafrica-nuclear-deal/ (Accessed on 30 October 2014). 
32
 Supra note 35. 
15 
 
 
opening up its economy to international competition post 1994 and the uncompetitive nature 
of SA firms to compete on the global market.
33
 What the report fails to highlight is the fact 
that it is as a direct result of government action that the SA manufacturing industries got 
exposed to international competition much earlier than required under the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) developing country rules. Immediately after joining the WTO in 1995 
and signing the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATS), Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), 
average import tariffs were reduced from 27.5% to 7% by 1997 with nearly 60% of imports 
being zero rated. This over-eager adoption of trade liberalisation policies resulted in the near 
collapse of the clothing and textile industries that, at the time, enjoyed high import tariffs.
34
 
This trade liberalisation e same report further notes that: 
As part of the trade liberalisation mechanisms introduced by the new government, exchange 
controls were left to the whim of the market with little state intervention which, till then, was 
an active function of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). This situation was also 
consequential to the adoption of inflation targeting with exchange controls becoming less of a 
priority.
35
  
To illustrate the volatile nature of the South African Rand and the extent of its 
depreciation, as at the 3
rd
 May 1994 the US Dollar Rand exchange rate was $1 – R3.51. As at 
the end of 2014, the US Dollar Rand exchange rate was $1 – R11.57. Similarly, over the same 
period the British sterling pound was £1 – R5.32 in 1994 escalating to £1 – R18.01 at the end 
of 2014.
36
  
In a recent study undertaken by the SA Reserve Bank (SARB) on the unusual nature 
of the SA economic structure, in a sample of emerging economies, SA stood out as the only 
economy that showed a very high service sector to output and employment combined with a 
declining industrial sector.
37
 The report further comments that “South Africa’s distribution of 
                                                          
33
 Presidency, 2014. 
34
 Op. cit note 15. 
35
 Bhorat, H., Hirsch, A., Kanbur, R. and Ncube, M. (2014). "Economic Policy in South Africa: Past Present and 
Future". Development Policy Research Unit Working Paper 201401. DPRU, University of Cape Town.   
36
 Available at 
https://www.resbank.co.za/Research/Rates/Pages/SelectedHistoricalExchangeAndInterestRates.aspx (Accessed 
on 09 September 2015). 
37
 South African Reserve Bank Working Paper Series WP/14/07, Exploring Unbalanced Growth in South Africa: 
Understanding the Sectoral Structure of the South African Economy. Available at 
https://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/News%20and%20Publications/Attachments/6465/WP1407.pdf (Accessed on 21 
October 2014). In terms of that report the structure of the SA economy is 3% agriculture; 32% Industry and 65% 
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output and employment is much closer to that of High Income countries than its peer group of 
Middle Income countries”. This is a further sign that there is a shift away from making the 
manufacturing sector as the engine of the SA economy to a finance-based economy. This 
trend towards a serviced-based economy coupled with a decline in manufacturing should be 
an area of concern particularly in the context of job creation (or the type of jobs being 
created) and current crisis levels of unemployment.  
Worse still, the significant emphasis placed on; in particular, the finance sector and the 
speculative regime it operates under have not come without its pitfalls. The liberalisation of 
finance capital, without adequate regulatory frameworks, led to large volumes of money 
leaving the country in what is known as ‘Capital flights’. It is argued that what many 
developing countries, SA included, shy away from is its financial regulatory framework, 
particularly tax evasion by large multinational companies that are ‘legally’ allowed to engage 
in tax haven operations thus depriving the country of much needed taxes. It is estimated that 
these practices cost developing countries between $100 to $160 billion annually in tax 
dodging.
38
 This issue came to the fore over the last few months when it was established that 
Lonmin Plc, the company the country’s deputy president, Cyril Ramaphosa, has substantial 
shares in, engaged in large scale channelling of revenue from its operating establishment, 
Lonmin, to tax-free Bermuda thus saving millions in taxes owed to the SA government.
39
 The 
company’s response was simply to say that their actions “were entirely legal and in no way 
unusual”.40  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Services. The CIA factbook list the GDP composition by sector (2013 estimates) as 2.6% agriculture; 29% 
Industry and 68.4% Services. Available at 
http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/south_africa/south_africa_economy.html (Accessed on 16 March 2015). 
The percentages may be marginal but, if the CIA figures are to be correct, it signals a further departure from an 
industrial based economy. 
38
 Oxfam. 2013. Tax evasion damaging poor country economies. Press Release, 1 September 2013. Available at: 
(http://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressrelease/2013-09-01/tax-evasion-damaging-poor-country-economies) 
(Accessed: 18 November 2014). It is interesting to note here that in the space of two days (18 and 19 November 
2014), I was privileged to attend two lectures where the lecturers, Frank Hoffer of the ILO and Prof David 
Harvey, commented that this is a serious problem confronting, in particular, developing countries.  
39
 Dick Forslund, The Bermuda Connection Profit shifting, inequality and unaffordability at Lonm in 1999-2012 
(2014). AIDC. Cape Town. Available at 
http://aidc.org.za/download/publications/wage_and_profits/Bermuda_Connection_Lonmin.pdf (Accessed on 05 
June 2015). 
40
 Craig Mckune, Questions Lonmin must answer, Mail & Garden, 16 October 2014. Available at 
http://mg.co.za/article/2014-10-16-questions-lonmin-must-answer (Accessed on 20 November 2014). The SA 
government is in the process of introducing tax reforms with the intent to stop these practices but whether that 
will happen with multinational corporations employing tax specialist for that purpose is another matter. On the 
current state of tax evasion and reforms, see Lisa Steyn, Clampdown on tax avoidance, Mail & Garden, 21 
November 2014. Available at http://mg.co.za/article/2014-11-20-clampdown-on-tax-avoidance (Accessed on 22 
November 2014).  
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Figure 9: Composition of GDP by major industries, 1994 and 2012 
 
Source: The Presidency, Twenty Year Review (1994-2014) 
1.8 EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY 
Consistent with the composition of GDP by major industries, employment follows a similar 
pattern - that of a shrinking manufacturing base and an ever expanding service sector 
employment. This is not surprising as it follows an international trend that is perhaps best 
described in the following ILO report: 
The bulk of new jobs are being created in private sector services, which will 
employ more than a third of the global workforce over the next five years. Public 
services in health care, education and administration will also see smaller 
increases, still reaching more than 12 per cent of total employment. In contrast, 
industrial employment is expected to stabilize globally at slightly below 22 per 
cent of total employment, mainly driven by a continuous rise in employment in 
construction whereas manufacturing industries continue to lose jobs. The 
advanced economies still account for the largest share of manufacturing jobs 
across the globe, but current trends will bring their employment share to below 
12 per cent by the end of 2019. Some emerging countries have also seen a fall in 
18 
 
 
their share of manufacturing employment, despite the fact that their 
manufacturing industries have not yet reached levels similar to those in advanced 
economies. In general, industrial employment is not likely to contribute strongly 
to employment recovery, despite its important role in structural transformation 
particularly in the emerging economies. Rather, service sector employment will 
remain the most dynamic area of job creation over the next five years.
41
 
There are two noteworthy considerations in the conclusions of the ILO report. Firstly, the 
recognition of the importance of manufacturing employment for its important role in 
structural transformation and, linked thereto, the fact that developing economies, much like 
developed economies, are moving towards service sector employment despite the fact that 
they (developing economies) have not yet reached levels similar to developed economies in 
their manufacturing industries. What this point to is a premature structural adjustment in the 
make-up of their economic structure in favour of the service sector.  
A key question that arises from these structural ‘re-alignments’ must surely be the 
question of what Marx referred to as surplus value and how surplus value is created. In the 
general scheme of things, the extraction of surplus value is the manner within which 
exploitation takes place under capitalism. This takes place in the form of the mode of 
production where workers produce goods that are sold at prices higher than the labour input 
cost resulting in surplus (profit) to the capitalist. The simple point being made here is the 
following: that the realisation of profit comes about as a result of goods/commodities being 
produced. Such production processes can only take place via manufacturing processes, that 
being industry.
42
  
A further distinction is drawn between ‘productive’ labour and ‘unproductive’ labour. 
As much as both forms of labour is regarded as wage labour and therefore part of the same 
working class, it is only through ‘productive’ labour that goods or commodities are produced 
from which surplus/profit is realised.
43
 ‘Unproductive’ labour would include, for example, 
                                                          
41
 International Labour Organisation, World employment and social outlook: Trends 2015 / International Labour 
Office. – Geneva: ILO, 2015 Available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---
publ/documents/publication/wcms_337069.pdf (Accessed on 16 March 2015).  
42
 For a detailed account see Fine, B. and Harris, L. 1979: Rereading Capital. 
43
 It is worth noting here that this line of argument does not accord with feminist economics which argues that 
national accounts, for example, should take account of women’s household productive activities and 
reproduction. See in this regard the work of Waring, Marilyn, and Gloria Steinem. If women counted: A new 
feminist economics. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988. 
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healthcare workers, teachers, financial brokers and retail workers. Put simply, those workers 
that are primarily engaged in the service sector. It therefore stands to reason that the service 
sector is not a creator of surplus/profit and, consequently, the move towards service sector 
employment at the expense of manufacturing jobs signals danger for economic growth, 
particularly for developing countries with a small industrial base. To quote Marx: 
… the fact that the self-expansion of capital based on the contradictory nature of 
capitalist production permits an actual free development only up to a certain point, 
so that in fact it constitutes an immanent fetter and barrier to production, which 
are continually broken through by the credit system. Hence, the credit system 
accelerates the material development of the productive forces and the 
establishment of the world-market. At the same time credit accelerates the violent 
eruptions of this contradiction -- crises -- and thereby the elements of 
disintegration of the old mode of production.
44
 
Figure 10: Employment by industry, September 2001 and third quarter 2008 and 2013 
 
Source: The Presidency, Twenty Year Review (1994-2014) 
                                                          
44
 (Marx, K., 1975, Vol.: III, Part: V, Chapter 27). 
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1.9 PRODUCTIVITY AND WAGES 
During every round of wage bargaining employers will argue that they can only grant wage 
increases proportionate to productivity increases. Their argument is based on the premise that 
the cost of labour is outpacing productivity levels. As much as unions consider this to be a 
bargaining tactic used by employers to deflect away from their wage demands, there is a 
greater recognition that they must confront such counter demands that wage adjustments must 
be linked to increased productivity. As can be observed from figure 11 below the average 
monthly wages for Elementary occupations
45
 only marginally increased (in real wage terms) 
from R3168 in 2010 to R4404 in 2015.
46
 As to what would constitute a national minimum 
wage, the social partners (government, organised business, organised labour and community 
organisations) are currently engaged in dialogue on introducing a national minimum wage. 
The question is thus posed: Is wage growth outpacing productivity growth in SA? The 
answer to that question appears to be a simple one – no. The converse is in fact the case - 
labour productivity outpaced real wages and salaries over the period 1989 to 2011.
47
 This 
trend has continued in a later SARB report (as illustrated in Figure 12 below). Such trends can 
only but increase the already high levels of income inequality in SA particularly if viewed 
from the high levels of unemployment prevalent in the country.  
Figure 11:  Average monthly wages for Elementary Occupations 
 
Source: LRS AWARD 
                                                          
45
 Elementary occupations consist of simple and routine tasks which mainly require the use of hand-held tools 
and often some physical effort (ILO). Available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco88/9.htm (Accessed on 05/06/2015). 
46
 As at 05/06/2015, that will amount to 1,102.68 BRL. Available at 
http://themoneyconverter.com/BRL/ZAR.aspx (Accessed on 05/06/2015). 
47
 SARB, (July 2012). In that study, the period under review was 1989 – 2011. 
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In a recent article Philippe Burger, Professor of Economics and Head of Department, 
University of the Free State argues that labours share of aggregate (non-agriculture) income – 
which comprises labour and capital income – significantly dropped from 57% in 1993 to 53% 
in 2013.
48
 In his analysis as to the major causes of this falling labour income, he notes that 
both the ILO (2013) and OECD (2012) confirmed that this has been an international trend 
over the past three decades and the major causes thereof being the introduction of new 
technology and the role of financialisation and the increasing role of aggressive returns-
oriented investment. Thus, over the period in figure 12 below (1993 – 2013), productivity 
increased by 66% whereas real private sector wages only increased by 53% and public sector 
wages by 37%. 
This brings into question the role of trade unions in ensuring that their membership 
base does not regress too much in terms of real wages. One fundamental problem with trade 
unions and wage bargaining in SA is the reliance they place on Inflation data, that is, their 
wage demands are coupled with the inflation rate at that time. There is a danger in doing so as 
inflation is backwards looking whereas wage adjustments are meant to be for the next year or 
so. Far too often wage agreements linked to inflation have the detrimental effect of reducing 
the purchasing power of workers when a sudden hike in inflation is experienced. The SA 
experience - that of high wage inequality - is particularly prone to such situations. As can be 
seen from Figure 13 below, wage increases and inflation effectively evened out over the 
recent periods. This whilst productivity levels increased at a much higher pace. 
Worse still, it will be difficult to see a reversal of such income inequalities when 
indicators point to a growing income gap between top management and ordinary workers. The 
Labour Research Service (LRS), a non-governmental organisation that reports of Executive 
remuneration annually, concluded that: 
In 2013 the average annual remuneration for an executive director was 
R9 391 950; chief executive officers received, on average, R13 701 836. A low-
wage worker would therefore have to work 16 years, 209 years and 309 years to 
                                                          
48
 Philippe Burger, Technology, labour power and labour’s declining income share in post-apartheid South 
Africa, 17 February 2015. Available at http://www.econ3x3.org/node/303 (Accessed on 18 March 2015). 
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earn what an average non-executive director, executive director and CEO 
respectively were paid in 2013.
49
  
Figure 12: Labour productivity and real wages, 1996 till 2013 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
                                                          
49
 Michelle Taal, OUR STAKE IN DIRECTORS’ FEES 1994 – 2014 in Bargaining Indicators 2014 Twenty 
years – a labour perspective.  
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Figure 13: Median Wage increases and Inflation, 1997 – 2013 
 
Given the current state of paralysis in the SA trade union movement there is little hope that 
these backward trends will be reversed. This is more so as the government is actively 
pursuing its neoliberal agenda that includes cutting back on above-inflationary increases both 
in the private and public sector. The organic relationship between Cosatu and the ANC 
government have done little to ‘mediate’ volatile industrial relations in SA. The converse is 
indeed the case - that of a total onslaught against organised labour by the ANC government. 
This constituted the chief reason why Cosatu expelled its biggest affiliate, the National Union 
of Metal Workers of South Africa (Numsa) who resolved not to support the ANC in the 2014 
National and Provincial elections and to form a united front against the growing levels of 
income inequality and neo-liberalism of the ANC government.  
 
1.4 LABOUR MARKET DYNAMICS 
Notwithstanding the advent of democracy in 1994 and the promised “better life for all”, there 
has been a steady decline in the labour force participation rate as evidenced in Figure 3. Over 
the same period, the employment-to-population ratio declined from 43.8% in 1994, 39.8% in 
2004 to 39.2% in 2013 (Table 2). Thus, as much as the labour force increased, such increase, 
24 
 
 
measured against an increased population, led to no growth in the number of employed 
people. Put differently, the number of new employment opportunities have not kept pace with 
new job seekers.  
Figure 3: SA labour force participation rate, 1994, 2004 and 2013 
 
Source: ILO KILM 
Table 2: SA Employment-to-population ratio, 1994, 2004 and 2013 
Year Employment ('000) Population ('000) 
Employment- to-
population ratio 
1994  11 255  25 701 43.8 
2004  13 014  32 730 39.8 
2013  14 584  37 227 39.2 
Source: ILO KILM 
Such a situation, as can be seen from Table 3, led to an increased unemployment rate over the 
period under consideration. What is a certainty, the ANC government has not been able to 
fulfil its elections promise to halve unemployment by 2014. In fact, as can be observed from 
the data, there has been an increase in the level of the unemployed.  
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The 2008 global financial crisis only made matters worse with reported statistics 
indicating that just over one million jobs were lost as a direct result of the crisis.
50
 This was 
somewhat offset with rising employment in the construction industry with employment levels 
in that industry jumping from just over 600 000 in 2003 to over a million over the period 
2005 till 2013.
51
 Much of this employment was for the building of the 2010 FIFA World Cup 
stadia that were hosted in SA.  
As one report note, the economic growth recorded post 1994 have not been able to 
absorb the number of new entrants into the labour market, particularly post the 2008 global 
crisis: 
 Over the period 2000-2008 for example, the data shows that the simple output 
employment elasticity stood at about 0.69, meaning that DPRU WORKING PAPER 
2014001 4 for every 1% increase in GDP, employment increased by 0.69%. This 
stands in sharp contrast to the post-crisis period (2008-2012), where a 1% increase in 
growth led to a 0.16% decline in employment. Put differently, this data shows that – 
for the post-crisis period – while average annual GDP growth stood at 1.9%, 
employment in this period declined by 0.3%.
52
 
It is accordingly argued that for there to be a considerable decrease in the current 
unemployment levels, government must play an active role in stimulating sustainable 
employment creation opportunities. Large scale public sector employment in infrastructural 
programs is one such means to stimulate employment opportunities. Key to this is the creation 
of new industrial sectors in the economy like, for example, a move towards greater 
beneficiation of natural resources. Such an initiative must be linked to private sector 
investment in the economy, in particular the manufacturing sector. But, to do so in the 
absence of changes to the current industrial, social and macro-economic policies may prove to 
be futile.  
                                                          
50
 Presidency, 2014.  
51
 StatsSA, 2014. See also the unpublished dissertation of Cottle, Eddie, “The Transformation of the 
Construction Sector in South Africa since Apartheid: Social Inequality and Labour”, 2014, Unicamp, Brasil.  
52
 Bhorat, H., Hirsch, A., Kanbur, R. and Ncube, M. (2014). "Economic Policy in South Africa: Past 
Present and Future". Development Policy Research Unit Working Paper 201401. DPRU, University of 
Cape Town. 
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Table 4: SA Total Unemployment, 1994, 2004 and 2013 
Year Labour force ('000) Unemployed ('000) 
Unemployment rate 
(%) 
1994  14 069  2 814 20.0 
2004  17 282  4 269 24.7 
2013  19 414  4 830 24.9 
Source: ILO KILM 
Another ‘theoretical’ question raised by such long term and chronicle levels of unemployment 
is the Marxian “reserve army of labour” or “relative surplus population”.53 Marx’s analysis 
shows how the reserve army of labour became an important factor in the accumulation 
process. The reserve army serves to depress the wage levels of the workforce during period of 
low growth or stagnation and it served as a readily available reservoir of new workers in 
periods of capitalist growth. From this perspective it can be concluded from the evidence that 
a greater rate of exploitation exists given the long periods of low growth. Put differently there 
is a significant increase in productivity coupled with a drop in real wages.  
 
1.10 THE MINERALS-ENERGY COMPLEX (MEC) 
It is argued that the literature on the state of the SA economy has as a key deficiency its 
failure to recognise the fundamental importance of the Minerals-Energy Complex (MEC) that 
is at the centre of the SA economy.
54
 The central line of argument Ben Fine and Zavareh 
Rustomjee presents is that the growth of the manufacturing sector is integrally linked around 
primary production and not, as many believe, through import substitution stimulated by the 
protection of consumer goods. This is so given the wealth of mineral resources in SA. Viewed 
in that context; 
The evolution of the MEC has left the economy with both strengths and 
weaknesses. The strengths arise out of the productive and infrastructural 
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 Marx, Karl. Das Kapital, Chapter 25. 
54
 Ben Fine and Zavareh Rustomjee, The Political Economy of South Africa: From Minerals-Energy Complex to 
Industrialization (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996). 
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capacities that have been build up around its core sectors. The weaknesses arise 
from the failure of this to be vertically integrated forward into the rest of the 
economy.
55
 
It is therefore important to explore the extent to which the MEC contributes to the chronic 
levels of unemployment in SA. Much of the literature review is taken from Fine and 
Rustomjee but it is not the focus of this work to give an over-descriptive account of the 
published work of the authors or their critics.
56
 
To start off, it is perhaps prudent to clarify what ‘constitute’ the economic sectors the 
MEC can be identified as so as to further explore its inter-relatedness and or dependency. 
According to Fine and Rustomjee, coal, gold, diamond and other mining activities; electricity; 
non-metallic mineral products; iron and steel basic industries and fertilisers, pesticides, 
synthetic resins, plastics, other chemicals, basic chemicals and petroleum constitute the 
minimum economic sector an MEC can be identified as.
57
 It is thus argued that the MEC core 
operates as a ‘feeder’ to each other, that is, the mining operations supplies the base material to 
its allied manufacturing operations who in turn will supply the mining operations. For 
example, 1988 statistical data shows that 58.3% of MEC inputs are from the MEC and that 
27.7% of MEC output is returned to MEC sectors.
58
 Perhaps more concerning, as the authors 
point out, is the relative decline in the Non-MEC manufacturing sector. This much is evident 
in Figure 9 above. This indicates that there are strong linkages amongst MEC sectors and 
weaker linkages with Non-MEC sectors. By implication, if the Non-MEC sectors cannot 
develop their own growth trajectory – either for local consumption or export orientated – they 
are bound to decline, both in GDP contribution and employment levels.  
1.11 HOW HAS THIS MEC INTER-RELATION / DEPENDENCY COME ABOUT?  
It is argued that this phenomena, that of conglomerate control over all sectors of the economy 
(mining, manufacturing and the financial sector) is possibly unique to SA. The foundation of 
that can be traced back to early industrialisation in SA with the discovery of diamonds and 
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gold and the level of capital investment that followed. As the argument goes, because the 
concentration of capital were held in the hands of a few conglomerates primarily located in 
the mining and downstream manufacturing sectors, they eventually expanded and dominated 
other sectors of the economy, from engineering to the finance sector. As one political 
economist commented, “Through their backward and forwards linkages and the close 
relationship they evolved with the state, the MEC acted as more than just a set of important 
industries – but as a “system” that imparted a particular direction to the accumulation path 
of the whole country”.59 
Linked thereto is the key characteristic of Apartheid capitalism, in particular Afrikaner 
and English capital and their later convergence. For a number of decades, Apartheid 
capitalism, based on the exploitation of cheap black labour, migrant labour and the homelands 
system and its range of racist legislation and practices, was a key driver of White capitalism 
in SA. The system of racist oppression guaranteed high profit levels and relative political 
stability. Furthermore, it created much of a buffer for ‘poor’ unskilled Whites who would 
enter the labour market with great ease and relatively much higher wages than comparatively 
skilled black labour. 
This practice has not changed under the ANC government. It was argued earlier in this 
chapter that the advent of democracy resulted in a number of key ANC leaders becoming 
multi-millionaires, some even dollar billionaires. This convergence of state and capital is a 
simple extension of the MEC core in the post-Apartheid SA economy. It is therefore not 
surprising that the sectors the new black bourgeoisie entered centred on primarily mining 
operations. As Fine and Rustomjee notes: 
… the objective of black advancement will be primarily confined to a minority for 
the narrow purpose of attaining social and political stability. Whether directly 
through the corridors of power or indirectly through the perceived need to 
establish an elusive ‘business confidence’, the MEC remains at the heart of 
policymaking and exerts a profound influence on social and economic 
reconstruction.
60
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There would be some basis to conclude that the MEC, historically and in the current period, 
controls the make-up of the SA economy with the buy-in of the state. But, if the argument that 
SA capital is reeking in massive profits, where are those profits being generated if there is no 
evident capital and or industrial expansion in SA? Can it simply be argued that the cheap 
Black labour system (and the huge profit margins generated from that) led to a situation 
where SA capital is happy with their current profit margins and see no need to expand? In the 
general scheme of capitalism that appears to be unlikely. After all, unless you expand you are 
likely to see a contraction in either profits or market share. If that is the case, where and how 
is SA capital making their money? 
1.12 SA CAPITAL IN AFRICA  
At the beginning of this chapter I pointed out that SA industry prospered in its earlier years 
mainly due to cheap labour from countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. But, it is not just 
‘imported’ cheap labour that SA companies benefitted from. They expanded their operations 
into the rest of Africa, not just to exploit that labour supply but much of its operations, 
including natural resources. Given its relative powerful economy in the region it assumed an 
imperialist character in all of Africa - in many instances with great devastation to the local 
communities. The following facts serves as examples of that.
61
 
 South African companies (private and state owned) has the largest Intraregional 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stock in Africa.
62
  
 South African based companies have been making profits ranging from 30-60% in the 
rest of Africa compared to 14-20% in SA.
63
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 One of the leading retailers, Shoprite, has its footprint firmly in Africa with 169 stores 
across the continent with a further 30 to open by June 2015 with the company 
reporting that weak economic growth in SA being a key driver of its expansion into 
Africa.
64
  
 MTN, a South African telecommunications company with the SA government holding 
a 15% share has been known for actively preventing its workers from joining trade 
unions.
65
 
 In 2007 Mozambican workers at Tongaat-Hulett, a major SA sugar producer, went on 
a wildcat strike over wages. Their wages at the time was 66 meticais
66
 per day, 
equivalent to R22 at current exchange rates.
67
  
These human right violations bear testimony to the nature of South African FDI in Africa. 
Given the fact that SA workers enjoy greater levels of protection it serves as an impetus for 
SA companies to invest in other parts of Africa where wages and other conditions are much 
lower. This in turn drives down wage rates in SA and may be the cause of what could be 
termed an investment strike by SA businesses not to expand their operations locally.  
This, in many respects, led to the now well documented xenophobic attacks of foreign 
nationals entering South African borders in search of employment and or simple survival.
68
 
This situation is not likely to improve in the foreseeable future with SA economic forecast 
lagging behind that of Sub-Saharan and other parts of Africa. Worse still, with a growing 
youth population and youth unemployment on the ever increase, we may witness civil unrest 
and protest action of the same scale during the Apartheid era.  
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1.13 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Faced with daily power outages and a shrinking industrial base coupled with lowering 
investor confidence, the employment prospects in SA looks bleak. With a growing 
population, particularly of working age, there is simply not enough jobs being created to 
accommodate them. It is thus argued that the demand for labour is outstripped by the supply 
of labour, that is, there are far too many workers available to work than that demanded by 
industry.
69
  
The reasons for this may be related to investor uncertainty; SA companies investing in 
the rest of Africa where labour cost, as shown above, is generally cheaper with the resulting 
effect of maximising profits or as Ben Fine & Zavareh Rustomjee argues, that the SA economy 
is still trapped in the MEC. Based on the data quoted above, it certainly cannot be argued that 
the level of unemployment (or lack of employment creating opportunities) is due to 
wage/productivity reasons. This I argue as the SA economy, historically and still today, is 
largely located within the low wage regime where productivity levels, at least over the last 
few years, outpaced wages. This does not mean to suggest that well-paid workers cannot be 
productive. So too, well-paid workers are more likely to stimulate domestic demand that will 
in turn increase productive capacity and the rate of profit to enterprise and, in turn, greater 
numbers of employment opportunities. Sadly, those realities are not evident in the SA context. 
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Chapter 2 
AN OVERVIEW OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND YOUTH 
UNEMPLOYMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
In order to modify the human organism, so that it may acquire skill and handiness 
in a given branch of industry, and become labour-power of a special kind, a 
special education or training is requisite, and this, on its part, costs an equivalent 
in commodities of a greater or less amount. This amount varies according to the 
more or less complicated character of the labour-power. The expenses of this 
education (excessively small in the case of ordinary labour-power), enter pro 
tanto into the total value spent in its production 
Marx, Karl, Capital Volume 1, chapter 6 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the general scheme of economics (and economic literature), there must be an underlying 
reason for any form of unemployment prevalent at a given time. This is more so if you have 
prolonged periods of youth unemployment in a country with a steadily growing young 
population.  
This chapter will critique the key reasons advanced by the SA government for the high 
levels of youth unemployment in the country. It is generally assumed that youth 
unemployment levels are, on average, double that of their adult counterparts.
70
 That may be 
so, but when youth unemployment reach the level of 65% of employable youth and total 
unemployment at the level of 25% of the working age population, there must be a serious 
problem with getting youth into employment.
71
  
2.2 THE MAIN ARGUMENTS OF THE SA GOVERNMENT 
In an attempt to deal with the problem of youth unemployment, the SA government and its 
social partners, organised business and labour alongside youth and community organisations, 
                                                          
70
 See in this regard Garraty, John Arthur, Unemployment in history at page 235. 
71
 Wolassa Lawisso Kumo, Jan Rieländer, Babatunde Omilola, African Economic Outlook. Available at 
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/southern-africa/south-africa/ (Accessed on 20 August 
2014). 
34 
 
 
signed the Youth Employment Accord.
72
 As the name suggest, this accord aims to get youth 
into employment. The Accord specifically records that: 
Such a strategy will require that the structural challenges in the economy are 
addressed, including poor skills, weak infrastructure, monopolies and cartels and 
lack of partnerships at workplace level. Particular attention should also be given 
to improving basic education outcomes as weak basic education feeds poor 
employment and economic performance.
73
  
By listing those specific areas, the social partners are clearly of the opinion that, if corrected, 
the chronically high level of youth unemployment in SA will be something of the past. But, 
unemployment by its very nature is not that simple. For if it is argued that by removing (or as 
suggested) “addressing” the structural challenges, it does not mean that all will indeed be 
employed. That implies full employment or, as the focus is on youth, full employment for the 
unemployed youth. This in turn raises the question of whether full employment, even if only 
for youth, as a concept is possible in a Marxian sense or in a global capitalist society in the 
current period. 
To test the above problem statement this chapter will explore these mentioned 
‘structural challenges’74 before I draw conclusions as to whether any or all of them are 
contributors to the critical levels of youth unemployment in South Africa. 
2.2.1 Poor skills 
This line of argument is that the youth do not possess the necessary skills required or sought 
by the labour market upon entry. Some refers to it as a “skills gap”.75 This skills gap argument 
presuppose that jobs are available in the labour market but cannot be filled because the 
unemployed youth do not possess the required skills needed by industry.  
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This reasoning is not new and has, historically, much to do with the mechanization of 
industry, that is, with technological advancement, machines produce manufactured items 
previously made by workers and at a much greater pace. Mechanization (highly innovative 
machinery) requires, so the argument goes, a more skilled and educated worker to operate 
these new types of machinery.
76
  
It is in this context that the concept of human capital theory comes into being.
77
 This 
theory presupposes that if companies and individuals invest enough in skills development, the 
benefits of economic achievement will offset the cost of the investment.
78
 This may, in some 
way, explain the quote of Marx at the start of this chapter save to say that he considered that 
the cost of such skills development is to be borne by the entrepreneur when he states that the 
“The expenses of this education … enter pro tanto into the total value spent in its production.” 
The financial considerations in applying the human capital theory would suggest that 
companies (and indeed governments) can, almost with certainty, calculate the training cost 
and the related financial benefit thereof. This is in fact not the case. As Ashton and Green 
concludes: 
Finally, it is virtually never the case that firms make precise calculations linking 
training expenditures to prospective profits in the manner suggested by the human 
capital approach … Similarly, at the National level decisions about training and 
education might be regarded as investments in the nation’s future but, even if the 
explicit objective is to raise productivity or economic growth, governments cannot 
make such investments on the basis of precise calculations.
79
  
If the above line of argument is to be followed, particularly in the context of the 
extraordinarily high levels of unemployed youth and their purported lack of skills for the 
demands of industry, an even greater amount of investment in skills development would be 
needed. If we accept that the business of businesses is to maximise profit, would businesses 
be prepared to undercut their profit margins to invest in the skill requirements of these 
unemployed and unskilled youth? And, to take from the quotation of Ashton and Green 
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above, would businesses do so if there is no guarantee on their return for such massive skills 
development investment? The answer, in both instances, must surely be no. We should also 
not lose sight of the fact that technological innovation is an evolving concept with new ways 
of doing things differently every day and, with that, the concomitant deskilling of the 
workforce.
80
 The concept of deskilling has further ramifications in that it could lead to what 
Guy Standing calls insecurity, constant dissatisfaction and stress.
81
 
Organised labour too accepted the notion that youth unemployment is due mainly as a 
result of poor skills. In 2010 Cosatu adopted a policy position wherein it is specifically 
recorded, under the section dealing with youth unemployment, that “Besides the absence of 
job opportunities reflected by the high level of job losers, these young people are ill-equipped 
to cope with the demands of the labour market, especially skills.”82 Not surprisingly, the 
Cosatu document seeks to remedy the poor skills scenario with some elements of the human 
capital theory fundamentals, in particular, the ‘transition’ from schooling to employment. This 
view, it is argued, has too easily become acceptable to organised labour.
83
 Perhaps more 
disconcerting is the notion that full employment can be created in the SA context with 
structural unemployment, particularly amongst youth, dating back several decades. For 
Cosatu, with its long tradition of Marxist political rhetoric, to have such a believe system is, 
politically speaking, wrong.  
Recent data released by statistics SA points to a growing percentage of skilled 
employment in the labour market from 20.6% in 1994 to 25.2% in 2014. Over the same 
period, semi-skilled and low-skilled employment levels dropped from 47% to 46.2% and 
32.4% to 28.5% respectively.
84
 Whilst the data points to a growing percentage of skilled 
labour (+4.6%), a proper reading of the skill component of the labour market points to 
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employment being largely concentrated in the semi and low-skill section of the economy. 
With a semi and low-skilled labour market of 74.7% of all employed people, there would be a 
strong argument that the SA economy is, historically and continues to be, primarily a low 
skills based economy. This is particularly the case in the mining and related industries that do 
not require a high degree of skilled worker. This is due mainly as a result of the structural 
problem with the SA economy. The argument advanced here is the following: not all 
economic institutional frameworks are based on a high skill labour market structure. 
Economies can grow (and consequently reduce unemployment) in a low or semi-skilled 
labour market environment.
85
  
A closer look at employment by occupation for the period April 2013 to March 2014 
(Table 4) confirms the relatively large concentration of semi and lower-skilled employment 
by occupations. As much as it points to a slightly higher managerial occupational category, 
the same cannot be said for professional and technician occupations. This is somewhat 
surprising given the legislative skills framework adopted by the SA government. The Skills 
Development Act (SDA)
86
 and National Skills Development Strategy, has as its main aim the 
transformation of the poor skilled workforce into a skilled workforce facilitated by Sector 
Education and Training Authorities (Setas) that operates in all economic sectors/industries.
87
 
The logic of Setas at the level of all economic sectors/industries was to create an equilibrium 
between the demand and supply side of skilled labour informed by the specificities of the 
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sector/industry needs.
88
 In addition to the Setas, the Vocational Education and Training (VET) 
colleges were to play an instrumental role in the reshaping of the much claimed skills 
revolution. Almost fifteen years into the new skills system there is very little, if any, 
improvement in the quality of VET graduates and their employability. Having said that, I 
align myself with the conclusions of Volker Wedekind that it is not the VET colleges that are 
to blame but the structure of the SA economy: 
If a political-economy lens is adopted, then the failure of the college sector to 
improve the employability of their graduates and to significantly reduce 
unemployment may have less to do with the poor quality of the colleges and their 
weak linkages to industry and is more likely a feature of the structure of the 
economy and how economic policies have been implemented that privilege a 
particular model of growth. A comprehensive discussion is not possible here, but 
there is significant evidence to suggest that there has been no attempt to 
fundamentally restructure the economy and that transformation has focused on the 
formation of a small black elite.
89
  
Table 4: Employment by occupation April 2013 to March 2014 (‘000) 
Main Occupation 
Apr - Jun 
2013 
Jul - Sep 
2013 
Oct - Dec 
2013 
Jan - Mar 
2014 
Manager  1 230 1 235 1 230  1 343 
Professional 917 957 893 877 
Technician 1 665  1 666 1 637 1 581 
Clerk 1 575 1 696 1 624 1 610 
Sales and services 2 096 2 181 2 298  2 282 
Skilled agriculture 63 67 75 65 
Craft and related trade 1 708 1 690 1 847 1 736 
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Plant and machine 
operator 
1 291 1 244 1 251 1 264 
Elementary 3 149 3 271 3 310 3 298 
Domestic worker 997 1 030 1 012 999 
Total 14 692 15 036 15 177 15 055 
Source: Stats S.A., Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS)  
There is another side of the poor skills argument and one that the SA government and its 
social partners seem to ignore – that of over-skilling. This phenomenon may not be as 
widespread in SA as it is the case in European countries
90
 but SA statistical data points to the 
fact that there is an ever growing number of the unemployed youth who possess university 
qualifications. It therefore stands to reason that a higher educational qualification could 
potentially create greater job opportunities, providing the higher educational qualification is 
sought by the labour market. For if the line of argument is that a good education should get 
you employment, by implication, it could mean that adequately qualified persons should not 
be unemployed.  
If that line of reasoning is to hold true, then the statistical data paints a different 
picture. As much as unemployment increased at all education levels between 1994 and 2014, 
the biggest proportional increase was at the level of tertiary education where the percentage 
unemployed tertiary qualified persons jumped from 6% in 1994 to 14% in 2014. Worse still, 
in a country where employment equity
91
 is actively pursued, the greatest proportion of 
unemployed tertiary qualified people are from amongst the Black population. Over the same 
period the number of unemployed Whites with a tertiary qualification decreased. This may be 
due to the fact that black employment increased by 95%, Indian employment by 47%, 
Coloured employment by 41% and White employment by 9%.
92
 By implication, that means 
that the labour market is able to absorb White university graduates but not Black graduates. 
Whilst it is not known why this is the case, including the type of qualifications obtained 
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between White and Black graduates, there may be a need for further research in this area. But, 
the fact that you obtained a tertiary qualification does not make that individual (or groups of 
individuals) to be skilled. Simply put, qualification does not equal skill.
93
 As Guy Standing 
puts it, “In a tertiary society, skill is as much about ‘body language’ and ‘emotional labour’ 
as about formal skills learned through years of schooling, formal qualifications or 
apprenticeship schemes.”94   
2.2.2 Weak infrastructure 
It is almost a truism that capital investment is less likely to occur in countries with weak 
infrastructure (roads, water, housing, education, etc) as large scale infrastructural 
development is extremely costly and likely to deter foreign investment.
95
 In the case of SA, it 
can hardly be called a new emerging economy as, apart from until recently being the largest 
economy in Africa,
96
 capitalist industrial production processes existed since the discovery of 
diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886.
97
 The early industrialization of SA, driven by the 
discovery of gold, was largely due to British colonialism followed by United States (US), 
European and British investment which boosted the secondary sector over the period 1920 till 
1970.
98
 
Apart from a period of sanctions and dis-investment in SA,
99
 due to its Apartheid 
policies adopted and during which period the economy turned towards imports substitution, 
there is hardly any basis to conclude that SA has a weak infrastructure in attracting foreign 
direct investment (FDI).
100
 The National Development Plan (NDP) identifies, as a key 
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constraint, measures to reduce business cost, that is, the cost of starting a new business, as a 
critical element that must be addressed. This view seems to be at odds with the 2014 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) country report on SA that 
paints a gloomy picture of business confidence and the investment climate for FDI in SA. It 
records that: 
South Africa represents an attractive investment destination for investors as it is 
open to foreign investment, which it views as a means to drive growth, improve 
international competitiveness, and obtain access to foreign markets. In addition, 
South Africa has a steadily growing market with significant further growth 
potential, exceptional access to other markets in Africa, well-developed financial 
institutions and capital markets, strong communication and transport links, lower 
labour costs than western industrialised countries, and significant reserves of raw 
materials. All sectors are open to investors; no government approval is required; 
there are few restrictions on the form or extent of foreign investment; foreign 
investors are allowed 100 per cent ownership or shareholding in South Africa; all 
foreign and domestic private entities are entitled to own land for business 
purposes; there is liberal repatriation of profits and other earnings; government 
does not impose performance requirements (PRs) on foreign companies as a 
condition for establishing, maintaining or expanding investments, or for access to 
tax and investment incentives; does not screen foreign investment; and does not 
require new investments to comply with specific requirements (although the 
Government encourages investments that strengthen, expand, or enhance 
technology in various strategic sectors). The opportunities for investment 
abound.
101
 
As much as the OECD report positively portraits the state of the SA economy for investment 
opportunities, in 2012 the SA government adopted a national infrastructure plan to upgrade 
and expand existing infrastructure development. This plan, to be implemented from 2013/14 
and with a total investment of R827 billion, is meant to address two areas of infrastructural 
development. The first to facilitate improved access to healthcare facilities, schools, water and 
sanitation and the second area investment in the construction of ports, improvements in road 
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and railway systems, electrification plants, etc to stimulate faster economic growth.
102
 In 
addition to this large scale infrastructural investment coming from the SA national fiscus, 
there is the intent that the newly created Brics development bank will invest in infrastructural 
projects in Brics and other emerging countries.
103
  
Whilst infrastructural investment is warranted in the areas of healthcare facilities, 
schools, electrification
104
 and water and sanitation, investment geared towards faster 
economic growth is questionable, particularly in the context of employment creation. This is 
argued as the SA economy is characterized as unusual for a developing country if measured 
by its economic sector characterization. Table 5 shows that the service sector is unusually 
high whilst the industrial sector is showing a steady decline. Thus, in the sample of emerging 
economies, SA was the only economy that showed a very high service sector to output and 
employment combined with a declining industrial sector.
105
 The report further comments that 
“South Africa’s distribution of output and employment is much closer to that of High Income 
countries than its peer group of Middle Income countries”.106  
Table 5: South African Economic structure (as a % of GDP) 
 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Agriculture 10 7 5 4 3 
Industry 38 40 44 35 32 
Services 52 52 51 61 65 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators  
Also, we should not lose sight of the fact that the SA government invested an estimated 
R39.3b in infrastructural development for the 2010 Fifa World Cup with no return on such 
huge investment for a single sports event. It is argued that job creation over that period is 
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questionable whilst construction companies raked in mega profits.
107
 Whilst it is accepted that 
infrastructural development is a necessity, regard must be had for whether infrastructural 
development like that of the World Cup will lead to any economic growth and job creation. 
This as virtually all of the stadia build became ‘white elephants’ and a burdening cost to the 
taxpayer to maintain its maintenance.  
2.2.3 Monopolies and cartels  
As a point of departure, I could not locate any economic or sociology literature on the link 
between unemployment and the operation of monopolies and cartels. However, and not for 
reasons due to a lack of literature, I dismiss the notion that there is a link between the levels of 
youth unemployment experienced and operations of either monopolies or cartels. To 
substantiate that line of reasoning, it is important to understand the two concepts. Monopolies, 
by definition, refers to a single supplier of goods or services in a market. There is no concrete 
evidence of a monopolistic firm operating in South Africa.
108
  
Cartels, on the other hand, is a different ball game in the South African economy with 
a few large private companies found guilty over the last few years. Two high profile examples 
are worth mentioning here: In the one example, the major bread producers, Premier, Tiger 
Brands, Pioneer and Foodcorp colluded, for a number of years on, amongst other, price 
fixing, distribution areas and not poaching each other’s employees.109 In the other example, 
15 construction firms colluded to fix prices for the construction of the 2010 FIFA World Cup 
soccer stadia.
110
 The penalty imposed on them amounted to R1.5 billion.  
In both these examples it is the consumers (essentially the poor) who suffers most. 
Notwithstanding the penalties imposed on the cartel members that amounts to relatively 
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nothing when measured against their profit accumulation as a result of the cartel operation 
and the suffering of large parts of the population who may not be able to afford, as is the case 
in the one example, a loaf of bread. In a country where the vast majority lives in abject 
poverty that could be the difference between life and death.  
2.2.4 Weak basic education 
It is an undeniable fact that the majority of South Africans were denied the right to decent 
education under apartheid.
 111
 The then education system only sought to educate blacks for the 
most elementary of jobs thus denying them the right to decent skills and employment 
opportunities.
112
 That is if you subscribe to the line of argument that there must be an organic 
nexus between schooling and the labour market.  
Perhaps more significantly for the purposes of this paper, youth constitute 37% of the 
population as at 2012 which is also the section of the population that is showing continued 
growth. It should be concerning to note that 39% of youth aged 15 – 24 either dropped out of 
school or never attended any educational institution. A significant source of income for youth-
headed households was remittance which accounted for 48.4% in 2002 and 39.8% in 2012. 
As much as there is a drop over the corresponding period, there was an increase in youth-
headed households becoming more dependent on pensions and grants as a means of income, 
from 1.2% in 2002 to 8.3% in 2012.
113
 This makes youth-headed households much dependent 
on the contributions of others, mainly from family members and the state.  
Before exploring the relationship between basic education and the labour market, it is 
prudent to note that the major reason advanced for dropping out of the schooling system is 
attributed to lack of money to pay for school fees (39%). This should be of concern for a 
number of reasons. The Freedom Charter, the ANC’s flagship policy document as a liberation 
movement, states that “Education shall be free, compulsory, universal and equal for all 
children; Higher education and technical training shall be opened to all by means of state 
allowances and scholarships awarded on the basis of merit”. 114  
                                                          
111
 http://www.southafrica.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=153:national-youth-
day&catid=37:south-africa-current-events&Itemid=157&lang=en (Accessed on 15 June 2014)  
112
 Ashton and Green (1996) at page 73. 
113
 StatsSA, 2013. 
114
 The Freedom Charter constitute a set of demands adopted at the Congress of the People, Kliptown, on 26 
June 1955 by chiefly the ANC and a number of other liberation organisations. It became the ‘guiding’ document 
of the ANC. Available at www.anc.org.za (Last visited on 06 November 2014).  
45 
 
 
After 20 years of ANC rule, education is not free and, as pointed out above, a major 
reason for the high dropout from the schooling system. To get out of the provision of free 
education, as enunciated in the freedom charter, section 29 of the Bill of Rights, as contained 
in the SA constitution, states that “Everyone has the right to a basic education, including 
adult basic education; and to further education, which the state, through reasonable 
measures, must make progressively available and accessible”115 (my emphasis). It therefore 
stands to reason that if the education sector is to improve fundamentally, there must be serious 
consideration that all spheres of the education sector (primary, secondary, tertiary and 
vocational education) be made free. Having said that, a large percentage of the national fiscus 
is allocated to education and related functions with the key emphasis on skills development.
116
 
Whilst this is a step in the right direction it is evident that much more needs to be done to 
correct the education imbalances of the Apartheid education system.  
Turning to the nuts and bolts, that is, whether basic education should be gearing 
learners for the demands of the labour market, I do not subscribe to that line of thinking. To 
suggest that there must be an organic link between basic education and the labour market is to 
suggest that the working masses must continue to be the slaves of industry.
117
 
Aside from the argument I advanced above under the section dealing with poor skills 
and, in particular, the neoclassical concept of Human Capital Theory (and the critique thereof 
by Ashton and Green), aside from robbing people of social, developmental education, there is 
simply no guarantee that reforms to the education system will correct the historical youth 
unemployment crisis in SA or even stimulating economic growth.
118
 To substantiate that line 
of argument, Vally and Motala relies on the following quote from the work of Williamson: 
Whether, therefore, education can play a role in promoting economic development 
or in hindering such development is something which cannot be assessed using 
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the crude quantitative techniques of economics ... Programmes for education 
cannot be discussed outside of the broader social ends they reflect. Ends 
themselves are not, however, disembodied; they reflect the interest and power of 
different social groups. Planning in education is therefore never neutral, never a 
matter reducible to criteria of technical efficiency ... The networks of international 
aid, the increasingly opaque workings of education ministries may mask the 
political issues but they exist, nevertheless.
119
 
Relying on the work of Cooper, Neville Alexander argues that universities are much to blame 
for this new ‘knowledge economy’ in that research work undertaken (and the funding thereof) 
are focused on the needs and demands of industry as opposed to the development of society. 
He calls this the ‘triple helix’ phenomenon involving University, Industry and Government 
(U-I-G) which originates in the USA and Canada, followed by Europe, Asia and Latin 
America and later in Africa.
120
    
2.3 WHAT DOES THE DATA TELL US? 
As can be seen from graph 1, the SA economy never reached its intended target of 6% growth 
per annum. The highest growth rate was 5.6% in 2006 with the lowest being -1.53% in 2009 
following the global economic crisis. Notwithstanding slight recovery during 2010/2011, it 
has been on a downward trend and showed its first contraction in the first quarter of 2014.
121
 
Business confidence in SA (Graph 2) has seen a significant drop from its 2005-2007 
high to a consistent 41% from 2010 onwards. This low business confidence listing is 
notwithstanding the fact that SA, according to the OECD, is amongst the easiest of all 
developing countries to set up a new business and higher return on investment. If this 
business confidence indicator is a real measure of potential investment outlook, than it may be 
questionable if a high cost capital investment regime, to spearhead economic growth, is likely 
to have the desired results. 
It is also argued that SA’s labour market is not flexible enough and that it is that 
reason why there is a lack of capital investment in the country and, consequently, not enough 
job creation, particularly amongst the youth. It is accordingly suggested that labour law 
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reforms (lowering the cost of hiring and firing workers, employment benefits, etc.) will 
encourage entrepreneurs to hire more workers. This view was debunked by a respected South 
African law professor, Paul Benjamin, who pointed out that the view that SA is one of the 
countries with the most inflexible labour laws is premised on subjective interviews/opinions 
of executives whilst the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
study is based on empirical data. In terms of the OECD findings, the SA employment laws are 
significantly flexible.
122
 
Graph 1: SA Business Confidence indicator, 2002 till 2012 
 
2.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter attempted to make sense of what the SA government and its social partners list 
as the main reasons for the high level of youth unemployment in the country. On the area 
of ‘poor skills’, this must be measured against the structure of the SA economy, that is, is the 
economic structure that of a high skill job demand or low and semi-skilled? The evidence 
suggest that the makeup of the economy is still geared towards a low to semiskilled job 
market when measured against the current employment data. Related hereto, statistical data 
suggest that the unemployment rate increased amongst those with university qualifications. 
This points to the fact that even those deemed to be ‘qualified’ are not absorbed into the 
labour market. Of particular interest here is the fact that the greater proportion of ‘qualified’ 
university graduate unemployed are from amongst African and Coloured Blacks. This in a 
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country where employment equity legislation applies may warrant further research as to the 
nature of their university studies and why they are not absorbed into the labour market.  
On the argument of weak infrastructure, I persist with my line of argument that 
infrastructural development is much needed but infrastructural development for the broader 
population. That will undoubtedly lead to development in the sense articulated by Amartya 
Sen. The large scale development plans and related budget to invite foreign investment, in my 
opinion, is questionable. This I argue for two reasons. Firstly, foreign direct investment 
already accounts for 42% of capital in SA. Secondly, the structure of the country’s economy 
is similar (somewhat confusing for a developing country) to that of a developed country with 
a shrinking industrial base and a service sector of 65%. In any event, there are no guarantees 
that you are likely to get any return on such huge investment. The 2010 Fifa World Cup is a 
most recent example of that. Perhaps worse, the recent multi-billion deal between the SA and 
Russian governments to explore nuclear energy can only but further pollute an already over-
polluted country. This does not mean that there should not be large scale public sector 
investment in the economy, particularly in new industrial sectors. Key in such an approach is 
to change the current operations of state owned enterprises in favour of large scale public 
sector investment. 
Not much can be said on the monopolies and cartel argument mainly due to a lack of 
literature. Aside from that, where cartels do operate the penalties imposed on them in favour 
of the government purse does little, if any, to compensate the hardship experienced by the 
poor masses. I am yet to see, in the case of the bread cartel, a lowering of the bread prices to 
levels before the operation of the cartel. At least in that way there would be some form of 
compensation to those who suffered most. The point made here is that notwithstanding their 
anti-competitive behavior, for which they were found guilty and paid some form of penalty, 
they continue to reap the benefits of their actions in the form of high bread prices at the 
expense of the poor. As for the relationship between monopolies and cartels and 
unemployment, none exist.  
The weak basic education argument, alongside the poor skills argument, is premised 
on the neoclassical notion of Human Capital Theory. As argued above, we should not 
liquidate education only to serve the interest of industry. In that regard, tertiary institutions 
should be cautious about its role in shaping the ideas of society including but not limited to 
the concept of ‘intellectualism’ and independent thinking. Having said that, SA’s history of 
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exclusionary education favouring Whites under Apartheid is still a contributing factor to a 
relatively poorly skilled workforce. The younger generation may have had better 
opportunities but large scale state funding is required. With that, the ANC government should 
implement its own resolutions to provide free quality education.   
Lastly, the economic performance line of argument is, simply put, absurd. The data 
shows that firms (local and international) have been raking in massive profit margins whereas 
the real wage of workers fell. This is also the case with income inequality where the 2 riches 
South Africans accumulated wealth equal to halve of the population. The OECD report too 
confirms that the investment climate in SA is amongst the best in the world with huge 
potential for returns on investment. The government’s argument, in this area, is therefore 
baseless.  
The above line of argument accords, somewhat surprisingly, with the National 
Development Plan reasoning why small businesses, the anticipated key driver of employment 
creation, failed to stimulate employment creation.
123
 As per the NDP, the least contributor is 
the ‘skills’ challenge and the major contributor listed as bad economic conditions and a 
decline in business/work load. The latter may be due to the 2007 global economic crisis that 
also negatively affected SA with job losses in excess of one million. The second biggest 
contributor, ‘labour regulations’, is questionable when measured against the OECD report and 
comments on the regulatory framework of the SA labour relations regime.
124
 The third biggest 
contributor that of having no plans to expand/being fully staffed perhaps best fit with the SA 
realities. 
What then constitute the basis for the high level of youth unemployment in SA if not 
for the reasons mentioned above? The unemployment problem is what can be referred to as a 
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demand deficiency, that is, the number of jobs created does not match the number of people 
seeking employment. Coupled thereto, the SA economy have not experienced the high and 
sustained levels of economic growth envisaged that would stimulate employment creation. 
But, the structure of the economy plays a significant part in that with an ever-diminishing 
industrial base in favour of an expanding service sector, a phenomenon that is uncommon to 
characteristics of a developing economy.  
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Chapter 3 
THE ANC GOVERNMENT’S JOB CREATION 
INITIATIVES/SCHEMES: WHAT INFORMED THOSE 
POLICY POSITIONS? 
How can the "protected" labour of the public workshops be so occupied, that its 
produce may not, by direct or indirect competition with the produce of outside 
labour, outweigh the advantage conferred upon the latter by the removal of the 
"unemployed" from the field of competition, in digging holes and filling them up 
again, or other useless work, the problem is a simple one. 
John A. Hobson, Problems of Poverty 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is generally held that Public works programmes, of which the Expanded Public Works 
Programme (EPWP) is one such example, is associated with Keynesian economics. This is in 
fact not the case. The history of Public works programmes, John A Garraty
125
 wrote, dates 
back to the building of the pyramids in Egypt and the Temple in Jerusalem. The key aim then, 
as it is now, was to keep the idle or unemployed busy. So, too, a year following the French 
Revolution of 1789, the newly elected Legislative Assembly initiated a public works 
programme for the unemployed.
126
 That programme did not work as it excluded women and 
was at a rate below that paid for manual labour and thus insufficient to sustain a family.
127
 
But, apart from just creating employment opportunities for the unemployed, public 
works programmes are viewed as a means to stimulate demand and, consequently, supply 
which meant more workers had to be employed to produce for the greater demand. Put 
differently, the fundamentals of this policy position rest on the notion that an economic 
climate must be created for entrepreneurs to invest in the economy which will in turn create 
employment opportunities and income generation. By generating an income, workers become 
the consumers of the goods produced which in turn will lead to more goods being produced 
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and more workers being employed to produce such goods. Thus, capital investment generates 
employment.
128
 It is therefore not surprising that public works programmes, as a stimulus for 
economic recovery, was centred on the employment of human bodies (the unemployed) as 
opposed to by the means of mechanisation.
129
   
How then is the South African EPWP analogous with historical programmes? This 
chapter will explore the history of the EPWP job creation scheme, from its policy 
conceptions, detail the views of organised labour that includes transforming the EPWP 
concept into an employer of last resort and, thereafter, look at the EPWP roll-out in the City 
of Cape Town (CoCT), one of the largest metropolitan municipalities in South Africa. After 
drawing some conclusions on the EPWP, I will explore the government new flagship youth 
employment programme, the Employment Tax Incentive or, as it is more commonly known, 
the youth wage subsidy.  
3.2 THE EXPANDED PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME (EPWP) 
3.2.1 The “birth” of the EPWP concept and why? 
The earliest indication of a public works programme concept in SA comes from the Cosatu 
Economic policy conference held on 27-29 March 1992. The purpose of that conference was 
to define, for Cosatu, its economic perspectives for the new democratic SA following the 
unbanning of the ANC and other liberation movement organisations in 1990 and the first 
democratic elections which were to be held in 1994. It is perhaps useful to record the key 
elements of the Cosatu public works resolution, in full, as the component parts thereof is the 
measure by which the current EPWP project will be assessed. The resolution thus reads as 
follows: 
3. Job Creation and Public Works Programmes 
In order to deal with the unemployment crisis, decisive strategic interventions are 
necessary to create jobs. 
These includes: 
1. Investment in sustainable jobs in a growing economy (long term) 
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 Keynes, John Maynard, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (London: Macmillan, 1936) 
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 Op cit note 130 at page 210. 
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2. Review government contracts and promote labour intensive methods 
3. Start a Public Works Scheme for mass employment and the creation of 
useful assets. 
4. A special programme of public works for unemployed youth 
COSATU supports the following principles to guide public works 
programmes: 
1. COSATU must develop proposals for public works schemes that are based 
on the needs of the community. 
2. There must be no displacement of workers in existing jobs because of the 
public works schemes. 
3. Wages relating to public works schemes needs to be negotiated by 
COSATU. 
4. Funding for the projects should come partly from the state and partly from a 
special tax on businesses. 
5. Selection criteria for the schemes should be simple, but fair. 
6. Training must be an essential component of the public works schemes. 
7. Planning and research are needed now if the public works schemes are to be 
implemented speedily and effectively in the future. 
8. The unions must be represented on the structures that govern the 
schemes.
130
 
A watered-down version of the Cosatu policy proposals found its way into what was to 
become the ANC’s economics policy proposals for a democratic SA as encapsulated in its 
elections manifesto, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).
131
 Of 
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 It is only proper to record that there is no stored online version of the 1992 Economic Policy Conference 
(EPC) on the Cosatu website. With the kind assistance of a long-time comrade I managed to obtain a copy of the 
original report and resolutions. It is also worthwhile to note here that the origin of the Cosatu public works 
proposals can be located in the freedom charter, the relevant section thereof reading, "The State shall recognise 
the right and duty of all to work".  
131
 For a full version of the ANC’s 1994 public works programme proposals, see 
http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02039/04lv02103/05lv02120/06lv02126.htm 
(Accessed on 15 November 2014). See also Phillips, Sean. "The Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP)." 
Presentation to the Conference on Overcoming Under-Development in South Africa’s Second Economy, 
Pretoria. 2004.  
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importance to note here is that the EPWP was seen as a key characteristic of a ‘welfare state’. 
The notion of a ‘welfare state’, in my opinion, warrants further interrogation and clarity. 132 I 
make this point as the ‘welfare state’ concept is sometimes used too ‘loosely’ with the 
resulting effect that a state is classified as being a ‘welfare state’ when in fact it is not. The SA 
state, having adopted the large-scale neoliberal market fundamentals, I submit, is not a 
welfare state. This I argue as even the provision of social services such as education, 
healthcare and other social securities is not universal (or free) in its application.  
Notwithstanding the public works concept being a component of the ANC’s 1994 
economic package to be implemented by the new government, it was only much later, in 
2003, that we saw the implementation of the EPWP in its current format. This followed the 
2002 ANC 51
st
 National Conference that adopted a range of employment creation initiatives 
that found its way into the Growth and Development Summit (GDS) Agreement
133
 signed by 
the National Economic Development and Labour Council (Nedlac) constituent members.
134
 
The parties reached broad agreement on the following interventions that, in its opinion, aimed 
to halve unemployment by 2014. These included: 
a. Public investment initiatives  
b. Expanded public works programmes  
c. Sector partnerships and strategies  
d. Local procurement  
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 There are many literature on what constitutes a ‘welfare’ state. The Oxford dictionary defines a ‘welfare 
state’ as, “A system whereby the government undertakes to protect the health and well-being of its citizens, 
especially those in financial or social need, by means of grants, pensions, and other benefits”. This definition 
would coincide with the ‘social’ protection regimes mentioned by Guy Standing, The Precariat the new 
dangerous class (2011) at page 44. This is however not the full conceptual understanding of the ‘welfare state’. 
Richard D Wolff & Stephen A Resnick, Contending Economic Theories: Neoclassical, Keynesian, and Marxian 
characterises the ‘welfare state’ as a “a system in which government taxation and state services are used to 
moderate and offset business cycles and to redistribute some income and wealth from the richer to the middle 
and poorer segments of the population.” In other words, unlike purely the provision of some benefits and 
insurances, government plays an active role in the economy in what is generally referred to as “market 
socialism”. The means, according to the authors, governments are able to do so is via state-owned enterprises. 
For a more detailed description of ‘welfare states’, see the work of Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of 
Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press & Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990 and The Social 
Foundations of Postindustrial Economies. Oxford University Press, 1999. 
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 The GDS agreement, signed on 7 June 2003, was a government initiative to get broad agreement between the 
respective role-players on “the investment, employment and poverty challenges” the country faced. See also the 
EPWP website. Available at http://www.epwp.gov.za (last accessed on 16 November 2014). 
134
 Nedlac is a tri-partite institution set up along the lines of the ILO, that is, comprising of government, the 
business sector, organised labour and, in South Africa, but as a junior party, community organisations. It serves 
as “the vehicle by which government, labour business and community organisations will seek to cooperate, 
through problem-solving and negotiation on economic, labour and development issues, and related challenges 
facing the country”. Nedlac founding declaration. Available at http://www.nedlac.org.za/about-us/founding-
declaration.aspx (accessed on 16 November 2014).  
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e. Small enterprise promotion  
f. Support for co-operatives  
g. Jobs impact and monitoring  
Apart from the fact that unemployment increased over the corresponding period, from 24.7% 
in 2004 (the implementation date of the EPWP) to 25.4% in 2014,
135
 the other employment 
initiatives yielded little, if any, positive results. If we were to only take account of the 
unemployment figures quoted above, by implication, the immediate observation would be that 
the EPWP failed to, as intended, halve unemployment by 2014. Having said that, it was 
recognised that the EPWP “is not a solution to the unemployment problem … The 
employment creation which will result from the EPWP is small in comparison to the scale of 
the unemployment problem”.136 
This view is shared by Maikel Lieuw-Kie-Song, independent consultant, researcher 
and former Chief Director in the Expanded Public Works Programme Unit at the South 
African Department of Public Works from 2003 to 2008, who argues that the unwarranted 
focus on the EPWP is largely due to the failures of the other schemes captured in the GDS 
agreement. 
In my view it would be worth reviewing the entire GDS agreement, and ask the 
question why the EPWP is one intervention that has received a lot of attention- 
while it was only one of many, and in reality the others are a lot more important 
than the EPWP which was seen more as a stop-gap, rather than a transformative 
intervention at the time. It is not like none of the others was implemented, but a 
lot of them were not, or to a limited degree only. 
Nonetheless, 11 years later, the focus is on EPWP. Is it because it was one of the 
few that was implemented and monitored? And so is it the only one about which it 
is possible to have a debate? If that were the case, has the EPWP then become the 
victim of its own success? Or was it because the other interventions in the GDS 
were wrong, unrealistic, unimplementable, rhetoric? Or did some fail and so 
nobody wants to talk about them? 
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 It must also be noted that over the same period the labour force substantially increased from 17.3 million in 
2004 to 20.3 million in 2014. (statssa, P0211, October 2014). 
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 Phillips, Sean. "The Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP)." Presentation to the Conference on 
Overcoming Under-Development in South Africa’s Second Economy, Pretoria. 
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So my main point is that the EPWP had its genesis as one part of a more 
comprehensive range of interventions, and so when you assess it you need to 
consider it as such as well. If the other interventions do not materialize, then the 
EPWP has to carry a much larger burden then initially considered, which it may 
not be able to do. So the reasons why the other interventions have fallen by the 
way side are as important a question as to what the EPWP has or has not been 
able to achieve. Or one could also take one step further back and review the GDS 
Agreement to ask the question if its analysis of the problems at the time was 
correct, and if not, presumably neither were the interventions agreed upon, and so 
that is why we are where we are.
137
 
3.3 THE EPWP PROJECT: NATIONAL ROLL-OUT AND SUCCESS STORIES?  
The EPWP department prides itself in having created over one million job opportunities 
before the expiry of its first five year roll-out programme with the key target group being the 
unemployed, able and willing to work; largely unskilled; people not receiving social grants; 
The poor; Women; People living with disabilities; and Youth, of which an estimated 70% 
were unemployed at the time.
138
 Whilst such an achievement is indeed to be commended, 
there is a fundamental difference between “job opportunities” and sustainable employment 
creation. This distinction is important as millions of “job opportunities” can be created whilst 
none of those “job opportunities” translate into employment in the formal economy.139 
The difference in methodological application is not surprising as the evaluation tool of 
the first five years specifically records that “the objective was not to create sustainable 
employment opportunities. Rather, PWPs were viewed as a means of creating a high volume 
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 Personal Interview with Maikel Lieuw-Kie-Song, 16 November 2014.  
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 See in this regard the first 5 year report of the EPWP department. Available at 
http://www.epwp.gov.za/documents/Cross_Cutting/Monitoring%20and%20Evaluation/EPWP_Five_Year_Repo
rt.pdf (Accessed on 16 November 2014). 
139
 The department of Public Works define a job opportunity as “1 job opportunity = paid work created for an 
individual on an EPWP project for any period of time. In the case of Social Sector projects, learnerships also 
constitute job opportunities”. EPWP My own experience of EPWP jobs in the City of Cape Town (CoCT), 
which will be dealt with later in this chapter, takes the form of workers, in many instances, being engaged for 
periods of two weeks. Following their ‘termination’, they are replaced by another worker performing the same 
function. So, for example, you can have 4 workers performing the same function within the space of 2 months. 
This is what I would term “employment recycling” where the same job is being performed by many workers to 
create what is termed “job opportunities” and thus boosting employment numbers. This view was also captured 
by the Cosatu secretariat report (10
th
 National Congress, 2009) which recorded that, “Much reliance has been 
placed on the Expanded Public Works Programme which created almost a million jobs in the three year period 
between 2004 and 2007. But important as these jobs have been, most of them were short term and have not 
helped facilitate employment into the formal economy”. - See more at: 
http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=2408#sthash.VBosw3EV.dpuf (Accessed on 17 November 2014). 
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of employment in the short term.”140 On that construction alone, the EPWP could be viewed 
no different to what John A Hobson, quoted above, refers to as “… digging holes and filling 
them up again, or other useless work, the problem is a simple one”.  
As part of its first 5 years review process, the EPWP department invited the ILO to 
contribute to its 5 year review and to do some comparative studies on international 
experiences that would map the next 5 year roll-out. In terms of international experiences, the 
Jefes y Jefas de Hogares Desocupados (Employment Road to Economic Recovery) of 
Argentina and the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) of India were 
considered. Whilst these two programmes showed measurable success, the fundamental 
difference identified with the SA public works programme included the above-mentioned 
peculiarities, that is, the duration of jobs created were shorter and income benefits, smaller 
than expected.
141
 
As much as those peculiarities exist, it would be wrong to entirely dismiss the impact 
of the EPWP employment creation initiative if purely for reasons that, if not implemented, the 
unemployment situation would have been much worse. In that context it is worth detailing 
some of its measurable achievements since its inception.
142
 What follows are employment 
data of the EPWP since 2004 comprising of the 4 target areas, that being, Infrastructure 
Projects; Environment and Culture; Social and the Economic sector. 
As pointed out earlier, the fact that the EPWP created 1.6 million job opportunities 
(Graph 3) is to be commended. This more so as it exceeded its target of 1 million job 
opportunities by over 600 000 more job opportunities. Having said that, it is to be noted that 
over the same period the labour force increased from 17.282 million to 18.892 million, that is, 
an increase of 1.6 million new entrants into the labour market. It would thus be correct to state 
that the EPWP in effect absorbed the new labour market entrants over the period 2004 – 2009. 
In fact, the labour force participation rate only marginally increased from 52.8% to 52.9%. 
This explains the relative stable, albeit high, unemployment rate of 24.7% (2004) and 23.7% 
(2009).
143
 What is evident from the graph is that infrastructural development, a key stimulus 
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 Ibid at page 59. 
141
 National Seminar on Reducing Unemployment and Poverty – International Experiences and Proposals for the 
Expanded Public Works Programme – Phase II: International Labour Office, Sectoral Activities Department – 
Geneva: ILO, 2009.  
142
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phase of the EPWP is currently underway and any conclusions thereon would be premature.  
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for sustainable job creation and a key driver of economic growth, lacks behind in terms of 
meeting its targets for the entire period of this review.  
Graph 3: Job opportunities per sector and financial year 
 
Source: Department of Public Works (own table) 
The number of job opportunities, per province (Graph 4), presents a somewhat concerning 
picture. This is so as the economic centres of the SA economy (Gauteng, Western Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal), apart from the Eastern Cape Province, appears to have the lion’s share of 
job opportunities created. For example, almost halve of the Infrastructure job opportunities 
were created in the KwaZulu-Natal province (44 185 out 88 479 job opportunities). This may 
be, as the 5 year review report suggest, due to the KwaZulu-Natal public works programmes 
having a longer lifespan than other programmes, but it would be expected that greater 
concentration of, for example, infrastructural investment, would be located in less resourced 
provinces. If the current trend of EPWP employment creation is not reversed, apart from in 
the Eastern Cape, the current migration to these 3 provinces (Gauteng, Western Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal) is likely to continue. That can only but lead to greater inequalities between 
and amongst provinces.  
0
200000
400000
600000
800000
1000000
1200000
1400000
1600000
1800000
Target 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9
W
o
rk
 O
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
ie
s 
Financial Year 
Infrastructure Environment and culture Social Economic Annual total Cumulative total
59 
 
 
Graph 4: Job opportunities per province  
 
Source: Department of Public Works (own table) 
The percentage of job opportunities, per designated group (Youth; Women and the Disabled) 
indicates, apart from the Infrastructure sector, higher employment opportunities for women. 
Whilst this is encouraging as women ordinarily suffer from higher levels of unemployment as 
opposed to their male counterparts, the data could be misleading if the youth data excludes 
young women which would have the resulting effect of the youth percentage being higher 
than the women percentage.  
There is a further distortion in the data presented, albeit for reasons relating to the 
youth age definition. As the SA government define youth to be those between the ages of 15 – 
34, as opposed to the international classification of 15 – 24, the youth participation rate are 
boosted by those job seekers between the ages of 25 – 34. As such, the participation of youth, 
by international classification, may be significantly less than the data provided. The difference 
is made difficult as there is no data detailing 5 year age cohorts, descriptions akin to 
population age profiles. Be that as it may, what is an obvious concern is the low penetration 
of employment creation for disabled people. This may be due to the EPWP being what it 
terms as a “labour intensive” job creation project but that in itself cannot mean to suggest that 
disabled people cannot perform many of the functions performed by able bodied persons. This 
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is more so as the employment sectors (Infrastructure Projects; Environment and Culture; 
Social and the Economic sector) presents many options for absorbing disabled people. 
Graph 5: Designated groups as a percentage of job opportunities (2004 – 2009) 
 
Source: Department of Public Works 
Another area worth mentioning is the wage rates associated with EPWP job opportunities. To 
recap, part of the objectives of the public works programme is to take the unemployed out of 
its vulnerable and poverty stricken situation. If that is the intent, than not much relief is 
afforded to the unemployed in terms of wage rates. Over the first 5 years, the average wage 
per day was R64 with the minimum being R38.
144
 These low wage floors must be measured 
against length of employment which averages 80 days with the lowest number of days being 
5. This is an important barometer in that the legislation governing EPWP employment is, by 
its very nature, short term and non-permanent. 
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 Ibid 14. For a currency conversion to US$, as at 23 November 2014, R64 per day equals US$5.84 whilst the 
minimum rate of R38 equates to US$3.47. (1 South African Rand equals 
0.091 US Dollar). http://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=1&From=ZAR&To=USD 
(Accessed on 23 November 2014). 
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3.4 EMPLOYER OF LAST RESORT 
The demand that the EPWP should be transformed into an employer of last resort (ELR) 
programme has its roots in the Cosatu “A Growth Path towards Full Employment” Policy 
document.
145
 It is not my intention to fully explore this employment creation option, chiefly 
because I do not consider it to be achievable under a Capitalist economic system and, for the 
purposes of this dissertation, it represents a policy perspective of a stakeholder in an alliance 
with a neo-liberal governing party, the ANC, which, quite frankly, makes it undesirable (to 
the ANC) to implement. Also, the focus of the dissertation is on active employment creation 
initiatives and not the perspectives of some. Having said that, it may be prudent to deal with 
some aspects of the Cosatu employer of last resort perspective.  
The Cosatu position paper on the need for the EPWP to transform into an ELR, to achieve full 
employment, is consequential to the shortcomings of the EPWP roll-out. The Cosatu 
document list the benefits of an ELR to be:  
It stabilises aggregate demand: In the event of a recession, the ELR pool 
expands and in the event of an expansion, the ELR pool contracts. By so doing, 
the ELR ensures shallow recessions and longer expansions. 
Because it stabilises demand, the ELR also contributes towards fiscal 
sustainability. 
It promotes decent employment: The ELR will make it impossible for 
precarious work to be rampant, because through this policy, the state would 
directly intervene to change the dynamics of the labour market. The ELR also 
directly deals with structural unemployment because it guarantees employment 
across all skills. 
It preserves the skills of the labour force, thereby contributing to preserving 
capacity growth during recessions. 
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 The status of this policy document is unclear. The Cosatu website www.cosatu.org.za list it as a draft 
discussion document purportedly ‘adopted’ on 11 September 2010. If it is to be a ‘draft’ discussion document, 
by implication, it means that there is no finality on the current version. This appears not to be the case as the 
‘draft’ document is articulated as the economic policy proposals of Cosatu, particular in the area of its employer 
of last resort concept. See in this regard the input of the Cosatu president, Sidumo Dlamini, at the Jobs for Youth 
Summit II, held from 26-28 October 2011. Available at http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=5609 (Accessed 
on 22 November 2014). 
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It promotes social cohesion by reducing problems associated with 
unemployment; such as crime and malnutrition. 
These policy proposals are out of sync with present day economic realities faced in SA and 
the global economy. Worse still, the ANC government is implementing economic reforms 
diametrically opposite to what Cosatu is advocating. This much is accepted by Cosatu in its 
critique of the ANC government’s National Development Plan (NDP) and one of the key 
reasons the National Union of Metal Workers of SA (Numsa) resolved not to vote ANC in the 
2014 elections that also resulted in their expulsion from Cosatu.
146
 Apart from my dismissive 
views on full employment above, Cosatu may need to be cautious of advancing such a policy 
perspective if the views of Joan Robinson is to be believed. In a newspaper article she argues 
that “If a full employment policy were successfully carried out, the raison d’etre of trade 
union obstructions to flexibility would disappear”. I furthermore agree with her conclusion in 
the same article when she states that “The fact that unregulated private enterprise and 
continuous full employment are incompatible must be frankly faced, if we are not to drift 
blindly in the fog”. 147 If the Joan Robinson reasoning is not enough, and leaving aside Marx 
and his concept of reserve army of labour, the following reasoning by Kalecki should put this 
matter to bed:  
The reasons for the opposition of the 'industrial leaders' to full employment 
achieved by government spending may be subdivided into three categories: 
(i) dislike of government interference in the problem of employment as such;  
(ii) dislike of the direction of government spending (public investment and 
subsidizing consumption);  
(iii) dislike of the social and political changes resulting from the maintenance of full 
employment.
148
 
Also, I could find no real evidence that public works programmes, as a means to either 
stimulate employment or simply keeping the unemployed busy, has had any lasting success 
throughout its history.
149
 As much as the literature only applies to public works programmes, 
I argue that the same holds true for an employer of last resort. In fact, I will argue that the 
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 Available at http://www.cosatu.org.za/docs/discussion/2013/analysis.pdf (Accessed on 23 November 2014). 
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 Available at http://sites.roosevelt.edu/glanger/files/2012/07/Robinson43-complete.pdf (Accessed on 23 
November 2014).  
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149
 Op cit note 130 at 119-120. 
63 
 
 
EPWP has become an employer of last resort. This I argue as the SA public works 
programme is not a stimulus to rescue industry from a slump but a programme that assumed a 
life of its own. The only difference, therefore, between the Cosatu position and the current 
roll-out of the EPWP is the extent to which job opportunities can be translated into permanent 
employment and expanding the number of recipients to cover all of the unemployed. This, I 
argue is not possible under Capitalism nor desired by the ANC government.  
3.5 A CASE STUDY: THE CITY OF CAPE TOWN (COCT) MUNICIPALITY 
EPWP PROJECT
150
 
This section will not deal with any theoretical aspects on the EPWP roll-out in the CoCT as 
that is fully dealt with above and would simply be a case of restating the obvious. It will 
concern itself with key statistical data and reflect on some engagement and struggles between 
the CoCT and the South African Municipal Workers’ Union (Samwu) on EPWP employment 
within the city. It is no accident that the CoCT is used as a case study to measure performance 
between the National EPWP roll-out and that of the municipality. The first reason for doing 
so relates to the city being recognised as the best municipality in rolling out the EPWP and, 
secondly, for reasons relating to my personal account of EPWP realities within the 
municipality.  
3.6 EMPLOYMENT DEMOGRAPHICS 
If the International classification of youth is used than the CoCT is employing a relatively low 
percentage of youth as part of its public works programme (Graph 6). The youth absorption is 
also significantly lower than the national average of just over 40%. The gender breakdown is 
on par with the national programme in terms of absorption but lacks behind their male 
counterparts. What is evidently lacking is data reflecting disabled people. 
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 I must declare that I have been in the employ of Samwu since 2004 and currently holds the position of 
provincial organiser in the unions Cape Town region. I do this declaration as I have been actively involved in 
some challenges between the union and the CoCT in respect of the city’s EPWP roll-out. Some views are 
therefore a personal account of events. 
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Graph 6: Age and Gender Breakdown 
 
 
Source: City of Cape Town 
3.7 EMPLOYMENT HISTORY 
As can be observed from graph 7 below, a large percentage of EPWP job opportunities are 
created from amongst those who were either retrenched or due to company closers and a very 
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low percentage, over both years, from new entrants into the labour market. Due to a lack of 
similar data at National level it is difficult to do a comparison. An obvious conclusion is that 
the CoCT EPWP is not attracting new entrants into the labour market (school leavers, etc.) if 
compared to graph 6 above (age in years).  
Graph 7: EPWP employment history 2012 & 2013 
 
Source: City of Cape Town 
3.8 EARNINGS AND SPENDING PATTERS 
The CoCT earning schedule is significantly higher than the average daily wage rates at 
National EPWP level and further introduces various pay schedules dependent on the level of 
skill and or qualifications obtained. Having said that, when doing a comparison with the 
National Wage rate (average of R64 per day) and the average National work days (80 days), 
the total earnings, per ordinary EPWP worker in the CoCT is proportionally less due to the 
average work days (40 days). Thus, whilst the CoCT is paying a higher rate per ordinary 
worker, the cumulative earnings of a COCT EPWP worker is R1 120 less than the cumulative 
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earnings of a National EPWP worker.
151
 At the same time, and as pointed out earlier, the 
CoCT is priding itself in being one of the best deliverer of EPWP job opportunities 
throughout the country.
152
 This is somewhat misleading and what I would call “recycling” of 
job opportunities. Put differently, any institution can multiply its EPWP job opportunities by 
simply reducing the average number of working days. My own experience as a union official 
hearing stories from EPWP workers attest to this. Many a worker will tell you that they only 
received contracts for a period of two weeks. Such claims are difficult to contest if the 
average working period amounts to 40 days. Furthermore, given that the legislative 
framework places certain restrictions on re-entry into EPWP employment opportunities within 
a 5 year period, once your contract expired you effective are doomed.  
If we look at the spending patterns below, it is hardly surprising that, for some, 98% of 
earnings are spend on food; 91% on clothing; 90% on electricity; 65% on school fees and 
52% on debt (all 2013 data). The spending patterns are a classic case of living from hand to 
mouth. What is of obvious concern in terms of the data is the high spending on education that, 
at least to the poorest of the poor, should be universal and free. As mentioned in chapter 1, the 
ANC government, notwithstanding its guiding principles of providing universal and free 
public schooling, failed to deliver on that promise. It is therefore not surprising, as that data 
shows, 39% of learners dropped out of school due to lack of money to pay for school fees. 
Yet, the very same government is arguing that weak basic education is one of the root causes 
for the high rate of youth unemployment in the country.  
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 This figure is based on a simple calculation of R64 per day multiply by 80 days equaling R5 120 (average 
earnings of a National EPWP worker). In the CoCT, the calculation is R100 per day multiplied by 40 days 
totaling R4 000. The difference being R1 120. 
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 See in this regard the media briefing of the CoCT mayor, Patricia de Lille, on the city’s EPWP achievements. 
Available at 
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Graph 8: Spending patterns 
 
Source: City of Cape Town 
3.9 CONCLUSIONS ON THE EPWP PROJECT 
There is a fundamental difference between the centuries old types of public works 
programmes implemented in various countries during periods of high unemployment and the 
one undertaken in SA. Internationally, the intent was to rid the economy of unemployment. 
That is, to make all those not employed to work in some scheme or another, thus creating 
some sort of full employment. The SA experience is distinctly different in that its 
achievements are very limited and hardly dented the number of unemployed persons or youth 
in the country.  
The Cosatu position paper, A Growth Path towards Full Employment, whilst 
acknowledging the shortcomings of the EPWP scheme, aims for it to be transformed into an 
employer of last resort. I have no intention to restate my views on that question other than to 
state that, in my opinion, the EPWP has in fact been transformed into an employer of last 
resort save to say with great difficulty absorbing the existing unemployed pool and the new 
entrants into the labour market. I argue this as the EPWP can no longer be seen as a stimulus 
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to kick start the economy and hope private investment will follow. The EPWP has taken on a 
life of its own, both in concept and national planning priorities.  
At the start of this chapter I made mention that the 1992 Cosatu Economic policy 
considerations must be used as a yardstick to evaluate the EPWP. To that extent, a few points 
are worth mentioning here. The Cosatu position argues that: 
“There must be no displacement of workers in existing jobs because of the public 
works schemes”. This has been a major area of contestation between Samwu and the CoCT. 
Union leaders (shop stewards) regularly reported that once workers leave the permanent 
fulltime employ of the municipality they are replaced with EPWP jobs. This has the resulting 
effect of reducing the municipality’s wage bill as a significant portion (if not the entire) 
EPWP wage bill comes from the National fiscus. In addition, municipalities receive 
incentives (additional revenue) depending on their EPWP roll-out performance. These 
performance agreements are not in the public domain and it is thus difficult to estimate the 
overall gains of municipalities. This approach is highly problematic. Government institutions 
should not operate on the basis of making money on a societal problem like critical 
unemployment levels. The CoCT, as an example, operate on these neoliberal principles.
153
 
What the mentioned Cosatu principles fails to state is that these EPWP jobs, at least a portion 
thereof, must become permanent fulltime jobs. Its employer of last resort position effectively 
calls for jobs in a second economy that could lead to employment into the first economy. 
What is needed is employment in the first economy as the notion of a second economy 
subscribes to neoliberal dogma to reduce wage rates, greater flexibility, etc. 
“Wages relating to public works schemes needs to be negotiated by COSATÙ”. The 
EPWP was implemented in 2004. Since its inception and till the current day, this principle has 
not been realised. With average wage rates of R64 per day and a legislative framework 
regulating wages of EPWP jobs, Cosatu may well need to ask itself why it allowed its alliance 
partner, the ruling ANC, to adopt such a policy perspective? 
“Funding for the projects should come partly from the state and partly from a special 
tax on businesses”. The answer to this principle is in the legislative framework governing 
                                                          
153
 See in this regard the extensive literature on the commodification of service delivery in the CoCT. McDonald, 
David A and Smith, Laila ‘Privatising Cape Town: From Apartheid to Neo-liberalism in the Mother City’ (2004) 
41 Urban Studies, No. 8, 1461–1484; Greg Ruiters ‘Contradictions in municipal services in contemporary South 
Africa: Disciplinary commodification and self-disconnections’ (2007) 27 Critical Social Policy no. 4, 487-508. 
McDonald, D. A. (2008) World Class Syndrome: Neoliberalism and Inequality in Cape Town at page 71. 
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EPWP. An EPWP is defined as “a programme to provide public or community assets or 
services through a labour intensive programme initiated by government and funded from 
public resources”154 (my emphasis).  
“Training must be an essential component of the public works schemes”. As much as 
this is a component part of the EPWP policy framework, little attention is paid to it. Part of 
the reasons is the relatively short period of employment and the fact that many EPWP job 
opportunities are task based, that is, once the task is completed, the job opportunity is 
completed. As performance indicators are linked to completed tasks, the lifespan of job 
opportunities are simultaneously shortened. The policy provision of the CoCT, for example, 
records that,  
Training of workers is not a prerequisite on EPWP projects but should be 
implemented where deemed possible and practical by the relevant department. 
Whether training of EPWP workers should be provided shall be determined at 
project level based on the following factors: 
i. Duration of the programme or project; 
ii. Nature of the work which may reasonably require training; 
iii. Availability of training budget; 
iv. Training and development objectives of the programme or projects  
“The unions must be represented on the structures that govern the schemes” There is no 
evidence that unions are represented at any level where EPWP job opportunities are created. 
My own experience in articulating such a provision was met with a candid response that the 
EPWP is regulated by national legislation which makes no provision for union involvement in 
its structures.  
In conclusion, these Cosatu principles, resolved 22 years ago and which effectively 
gave birth to the EPWP as we know it today, is yet to be realised. As for the reasons we failed 
to achieve any of these demands, the answer is to be found in the text. 
                                                          
154
 Ministerial Determination 4: Expanded Public Works Programme, issued in terms of section 50 of the BCEA 
on May 2012.  
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3.10 THE EMPLOYMENT TAX INCENTIVE: A BENEFIT TO YOUTH OR 
CAPITAL? 
As demonstrated above, the EPWP job creation scheme had limited success in effectively 
dealing with the problem of structural youth unemployment in SA. A new ‘scheme’ had to be 
devised that would get youth into employment. That new ‘scheme’ is the Employment Tax 
Incentive, or, as it is more commonly known, the Youth Wage Subsidy (YWS).   
3.11 THE CONCEPT OF A YOUTH WAGE SUBSIDY 
The concept of an Employment Tax Incentive is to encourage firms to hire new workers as 
the cost thereof is offset, in part, by a government subsidy. Ordinarily such a scheme is 
targeted towards younger workers to facilitate the transition from school to work.
155
 From this 
line of reasoning the SA government were persuaded by the recommendations of the 
International Growth Advisory Panel (IGAP) to implement a company tax incentive to 
employ new entrants into the labour market.
156
 In his paper, James Levinsohn, in analyzing 
the ‘market imperfections’ in the SA labour market, argues that the level of youth 
unemployment is due primarily to three ‘imperfections’ that warrants a wage subsidy. These 
are, a lack of adequately trained school leavers; societal problems like crime, and, thirdly, 
rigid dismissal procedures coupled with rising union negotiated wage levels that, so he 
argues, discourages new labour market entrants from accepting wage levels lower than the 
union negotiated rates.
157
  
These ‘market imperfections’ accords with the viewpoint of the SA government in 
their National Development Plan (NDP).
158
 These neoclassical line of reasoning, especially 
the skills and wage rate arguments, do not, for reasons advanced in chapter 1, fit in with the 
SA youth unemployment reality. As argued earlier, the structure of the SA economy and the 
lack of Capital investment are the major contributors to the high level of general 
unemployment and, in particular, youth unemployment.  
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 Levinsohn, J., 2008. Two Policies to Alleviate Unemployment in South Africa. Center for International 
Development at Harvard University Working Paper 166. 
156
 A YOUTH WAGE SUBSIDY EXPERIMENT FOR SOUTH AFRICA. Available at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_237074.pdf 
(Accessed on 01 December 2014). 
157
 Ibid.  
158
 National Development Plan, Vision for 2030. Available at 
http://www.npconline.co.za/medialib/downloads/home/NPC%20National%20Development%20Plan%20Vision
%202030%20-lo-res.pdf (Accessed on 01 December 2014). 
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Nonetheless, the SA government legislated the Employment Tax Incentive Act that 
lists as one of its preambles that, “government wishes to support employment growth by 
focusing on labour market activation, especially in relation to young work seekers”.159 This 
ambitious plan, effective from the 1
st
 January 2014, has been the subject of much ideological 
debate between the ANC government and its alliance partner, Cosatu. For now, the ANC 
government is pushing ahead with its now legislated policy thus implying that whatever the 
ideological differences may be, it will not be stopped by a junior alliance partner. 
3.12 THE BASIS OF COSATU’S CRITIQUE  
The Cosatu position paper
160
 on the YWS concerns itself, mainly, on the fact that if firms 
receive a subsidy for the employment of youth, at wage rates lower that older workers, this 
will incentivise firms to get rid of older (higher paid) workers in favour of younger (lower 
paid) workers. Given the fact that the subsidy is for a maximum period of two years, firms 
will simply replace existing young workers with new ones to retain the wage subsidy.  
This employment substitution will affect the unskilled and semi-skilled labour force 
which would be easily replaced by younger workers. A second critical element of the Cosatu 
position concerns the cost of hiring a young worker with the resulting effect of putting 
downward pressure on wage rates thus increasing inequality. This is likely to happen as the 
subsidy is 50% for a person with an annual earnings of R24 000 per annum (R2 000 per 
month) with 0% subsidy for someone earning R60 000 per annum (R5 000 per month). 
Therefore, an employer would offer the least wage rates to receive the maximum subsidy 
provision.  
Notwithstanding its vehement opposition to the YWS, Cosatu has not been able to 
garner mass based support to challenge the introduction of the YWS. This, I argue, is due to 
Cosatu being in a state of paralysis for the last few years and, as a result thereof, unable to 
challenge the governments’ onslaught in lowering real wages and related conditions of 
service.  
                                                          
159
 Employment Tax Incentive Act, act No. 26 of 2013. Available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/legislation/acts/2013/Act%2026%20of%202013%20-%20EmployTaxIncen.pdf 
(Accessed on 01 December 2014). 
160
 For a detailed summary of the Cosatu critique on the YWS, see “The Youth Wage Subsidy in South Africa: 
Response of the Congress of South African Trade Unions”. Available at 
http://www.cosatu.org.za/docs/misc/2013/youthwagesubsidy.pdf (Accessed on 01 December 2014).  
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3.13 CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE YOUTH WAGE SUBSIDY 
I do not believe that the concept of a subsidy for the employment of unemployed youth is a 
misreading of the lack of employment in SA. The ANC government accepts that firms are not 
reinvesting their profits by expanding their operations thus leading to increased employment 
potentials. To induce firms to employ more, the SA government is offering them an incentive 
in the form of a wage subsidy.  
Current indications are that the youth wage subsidy is met with skepticism from the 
business community and, unless this trend is reversed, this government employment scheme 
is likely to suffer the same faith as the EPWP scheme – that of not bringing about any real 
changes to the high levels of youth unemployment.  
From a political economy point of view, the Cosatu position paper on the YWS may 
prove to be correct. Having said that, ideology aside, it is way too soon to definitively 
conclude on that. For now Cosatu must accept the reality that there is a growing ideological 
gap between its articulated, albeit somewhat reformist economic fundamentals, and the 
neoliberal policies of its alliance partner, the ruling ANC.  
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
South Africa is rich in mineral resources. It is the world largest producer of platinum and 
chrome; the second largest producer of zirconium, amongst other metals, and the third largest 
exporter of coal. It is therefore not surprising that its industrial base is closely tied to the 
minerals sector what Ben Fine and others call the Minerals-Energy-Complex (MEC). The 
problem with the MEC link is the fact that it has constrained the expansion of the industrial 
base in SA.  
Linked thereto, during the Apartheid era the import substitution industries never really 
developed to the level where they could compete on the international market. They in effect 
only produced for the local market. Thus, when SA opened its markets to international 
competition, at a rate much higher than required, many industries nearly collapsed. This was 
particularly the case with the clothing and textile industries that suffered significantly mainly 
due to much cheaper Chinese imports. The resulting effect of these were large scale job losses 
of workers with relatively low skill levels. To many of those workers unemployment became 
a permanent feature.  
Faced with the reality of consistent high levels of unemployment, poverty and a 
growing income gap, the ANC government initially attempted to advance macro-economic 
policies geared towards redistribution and job creation. The RDP sought to advance that 
agenda. It was however not long thereafter that the government shifted its macro-economic 
policies embracing the fundamentals of neo-liberalism. The ANC’s alliance partners, Cosatu 
and the SACP, may have had diametrically different perspectives on what was required to 
stimulate the SA economy but the ANC were not going to be dictated to by its junior partners. 
And, as much as Cosatu, in particular, declared war on the implementation of Gear, they 
could not muster their grandstanding with real protest action of its mass based membership 
and broader society. Cosatu in effect succumbed to the reality of the dictates of international 
capital. The cost of that reality meant a 20% reduction in trade union membership over the 
period 1994 to 2014. As the data in this thesis confirms, there has been a reduction in the 
wage rates of the lower paid working masses when measured against productivity levels. It 
therefore holds true that a weaker trade union equals weaker employment conditions.  
But, that was not to be the only loss to the trade union movement. As the ANC 
introduced more and more anti-poor policies some trade unions started vehemently 
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challenging the ANC government. The Numsa, for example, adopted resolutions calling on 
their membership to not vote ANC in the 2014 national elections. The price they paid for that 
was being expelled as an affiliate of Cosatu. Their radicalism was not shared by the majority 
of Cosatu affiliates who are staunch supporters of the ANC. The current split in Cosatu that 
largely created a state of paralysis of the federation is still the subject matter of court 
proceedings and it will be interesting to see how that will unfold and the political direction 
Cosatu is to take in the future. 
The global employment situation particularly looks bad. The ILO 2015 world 
employment social outlook, for example, records that 61 million jobs were lost since the 2008 
global economic crisis. It is further predicted that some 280 million jobs will need to be 
created over the next 5 years if new entrants into the labour market is to be taken into account 
to close the employment losses since the crisis. With the global economy showing a decline it 
is highly unlikely that such employment targets will be met. Worse still, the same report 
records that youth unemployment are 3 times that of adult unemployment. The SA reality is 
one such example. It would appear that the disequilibrium between the demand and supply of 
labour is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. 
The fact that there is no effective social security nets does not help the SA working 
masses and unemployed. Those who become unemployed only qualifies for up to a maximum 
of 34 weeks of unemployment benefits at a rate of between 38% and 58% of their last 
earnings. Social dialogue is only now taking place to introduce a national minimum wage. 
There is likely to be serious disagreement as to what amount the minimum wage should be. 
So too, for years the trade union movement and civil society petitioned the government to 
introduce a basic income grant - something similar to the bolsa familia in Brasil. Till now 
they have been unsuccessful in achieving that.  
Being one of the most unequal countries in the world does not help either. In a country 
where, for example, 2 people have a combined wealth equal to 50% of the country’s 
population, there would be good reason to assist the poor in the form of universal and free 
schooling, healthcare and other basic services. In that regard the ANC government is not 
acting in accordance with its own policy documents that such basic services must be free. 
Such a situation only but increases the burden on the poor and creates fertile grounds for the 
high levels of community protest action observed over the last few years. Worse than that has 
been the recent xenophobic attacks, the second such occurrence since the 2007. The main 
75 
 
 
reason advanced is that of employment opportunities. This is absurd as the SA economy has 
much to be thankful to migrant workers from the rest of Africa. Unless the unemployment 
situation changes we are likely to see similar such instances in the future. Sad indeed.  
A key feature of the SA economy is its relatively high service sector for a developing 
country when compared to countries like Brasil, for example, with a much bigger economy. 
Coupled with that is a shrinking manufacturing base. This one of the major contributors to the 
current levels of unemployment. Also, the type of jobs created in the service sector is not just 
low paid but akin to what Guy Standing would call the precariat. It is also a sector that is 
under-organised in terms of union membership. This is due largely to the type of employment 
relations (short term and in many cases without employment contracts). Another key 
impediment to job creation is the relatively small informal sector. Initiatives needs to be 
considered to boost informal sector employment without such employment being located in 
the second economy or of no real value.   
Turning to the SA government’s employment creation initiatives, the expanded public 
works programme and youth wage subsidy, there is little evidence that the 2 schemes reduced 
unemployment. The converse is in fact the case, that is, notwithstanding the operation of these 
schemes, unemployment levels increased. Having said that, it is to be noted that had the 
EPWP not been implemented unemployment levels will be higher. In that regard the EPWP 
effectively became a ‘buffer’ in the employment / unemployment levels.  
Perhaps of concern in terms of the EPWP types of employment relates to the fact that 
there is little evidence that it translated into formal permanent employment. In the case of the 
City of Cape Town, the average number of working days is 40, half of the average national 
working days. The current regulations does not permit a person to re-enter the system for a 
period of 5 years following the completion of an EPWP contract. By implication, and 
especially informed by the high levels of unemployment, this would translate into 40 (or 80) 
days’ work every 5 years. This is particularly concerning as there was a significant decline, 
from 8.3% in 2001 to 4.3% in 2013, of the working-age population defined as self-employed. 
This is very low compared to international standards.    
The line of argument advanced by Cosatu that the EPWP should be transformed into 
an employer-of-last-resort constitute a lack of analysis on the part of organised labour. It is 
my view that the EPWP has already become an employer-of-last-resort. This I argue as it has 
taken on a life of its own. It is certainly not the type of kick-start employment creation 
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initiatives throughout the history of public works programmes. Also, the wage component 
thereof contributed to the widening income gap. 
The youth wage subsidy on the other hand makes no economic sense. It is in fact 
another incentive employers can use to super exploit young workers. The evidence of that 
already exist. Yet, current data suggest that it has not boosted employment levels. Thus, as 
much as employers are given an incentive to employ more workers, they have not done so. 
This points to an economic reality that the supply of labour is much greater than the demand 
for labour and a lack of capital investment. SA businesses are expanding but they are not 
expanding in South Africa. They do so in the rest of Africa where they are able to make mega 
profits mainly as a result of low wages and poor working conditions.  
 The fact that organised labour could not challenge this is indicative of the current 
state of the SA trade union movement. The Cosatu position is indeed correct that the youth 
wage subsidy could be used by employers to dismiss older and higher paid workers in favour 
of younger and lower paid youth. But, ideology is not enough to win the battle. It requires a 
militant trade union movement.  
  Lastly, whatever informed the ANC government’s employment schemes, the lack of 
job creation is certainty not due to poor skills. An analysis of the SA economy points to close 
to 75% of all jobs in the economy being located in the unskilled and semi-skilled categories. 
This is indicative of the SA economy being located in the MEC. Secondly, the percentage of 
unemployed youth with a university degree is increasing signalling that there is a higher 
unemployed skill supply but no demand.  
The South African reality requires a rethinking. Organised labour and other 
progressive civil society organisations needs to converge and unpack the modalities of the SA 
economy and to provide leadership on what is to be done. This will require from them to 
show working-class maturity in tackling the growing crisis of unemployment, inequality and 
poverty. 
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